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RECENT CASES
Civil Procedure-Service of Process-California
Long-Arm Statutes Abrogate State's Immunity
Doctrine
Seeking recovery of money owed him by defendant European corporations;' plaintiff2 brought suit in a California state court.
While attending federal district court in Florida for the sole purpose
of giving a deposition in a trademark infringement suit instituted
by one of the corporations, defendants' representative 3 was personally served with process4 in the California action on behalf of himself
and the defendant corporations. Defendants moved to quash service
of process on the ground that the immunity rule prohibited service
of civil process upon a witness in attendance in a court outside of
the territorial jurisdiction of his residence. Plaintiff countered by
challenging the validity of the immunity rule in light of California's
long-arm statutes. On the basis of the immunity doctrine as invoked
by defendants, the California trial court granted defendants' motion
to quash service of process made upon them in Florida. On appeal
1. Adidas Sportschuhfabriken, 2 other European corporations, and Horst Dassler were
named as defendants.
2. Plaintiff, Clifford Severn, was doing business as Clifford Severn Sporting Goods. It
was conceded by both parties that defendant corporations had sufficient contacts with California so as to make the exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over them by a California court
constitutional.
3. Horst Dassler, a resident of France, was authorized to receive service of process on
behalf of defendant corporations under California Code of Civil Procedure § 416.10(b).
4. The pertinent portions of the California Code of Civil Procedure provide as follows:
"A court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with
the Constitution of this state or of the United States." CAL. CODE OF CIV. PROCEDURE
§ 410.10 (West 1973).
"Except as otherwise provided by statute, a summons shall be served on a person
(a) Within this state, as provided in this chapter.
(b) Outside this state but within the United States, as provided in this chapter or as
prescribed by the law of the place where the person is served.
(c) Outside the United States, as provided in this chapter or as directed by the court
in which the action is pending, or, if the court before or after service finds that the service is
reasonably calculated to give actual notice, as prescribed by the law of the place where the
person is served or as directed by the foreign authority in response to a letter rogatory." Id.

§ 413.10.
"A summons may be served by personal delivery of a copy of the summons and of the
complaint to the person to be served. Service of a summons in this manner is deemed
complete at the time of such delivery." Id. § 415.10.
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to the California Court of Appeal, held, reversed. The enactment of
statutes expanding the reach of California's judicial process to every
state and to territories outside the United States abrogates the
state's common-law immunity doctrine, since such long-arm statutes eliminate the traditional justifications for the immunity rule.
Severn v. Adidas Sportschuhfabriken,33 Cal. App. 3d 754, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 328 (1973).
Courts of this nation traditionally have accorded witnesses attending court outside the territorial jurisdiction of their residences
an immunity or privilege from service of civil process while present
at the trial or hearing, and for a reasonable time in traveling to and
from court.' The historical origins of the immunity doctrine date
from early English judicial history when process was effected by the
body attachment, or arrest, of the defendant.' As adopted and applied in the United States, the rule has been justified by most courts
as necessary to prevent the disruption of the court's functioning
which would accompany the arrest of an attending witness and to
encourage nonresident witnesses to appear in aid of the administration of justice 7 by removing the fear of being subjected to a lawsuit
which they might otherwise avoid by remaining outside the court's
territorial jurisdiction.8 The vast majority of states grants the privilege to nonresident witnesses,' whether voluntary or subpoenaed, 10
and to nonresident parties." Despite its widespread recognition, the
5. See, e.g., Stewart v. Ramsay, 242 U.S. 128 (1916); Rorick v. Chancey, 130 Fla. 442,
178 So. 112 (1937); Wheeler v. Flintoff, 156 Va. 923, 159 S.E. 112 (1931). See generally 62
AM. Jiu. 2d Process §§ 136-56 (1972); 72 C.J.S. Process §§ 80-89 (1951).
6. Powers v. Arkadelphia Lumber Co., 61 Ark. 504, 507, 33 S.W. 842, 843 (1896); Mertens v. McMahon, 334 Mo. 175, 185, 66 S.W.2d 127, 131 (1933); Fisher v. Bouchelle, 134 W.
Va. 333, 335-36, 61 S.E. 2d 305, 308 (1950). See 12 CATH. U.L. REv. 46, 47 (1963).
7. Lamb v. Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222, 225 (1932); Durst v. Tautges, Wilder & McDonald,
44 F.2d 507, 508-09 (7th Cir. 1930); Moseley v. Ricks, 223 Iowa 1038, 1041, 274 N.W. 23, 24
(1937); Crusco v. Strunk Steel Co., 365 Pa. 326, 328-29, 74 A.2d 142, 143 (1950).
8. Lamb v. Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222, 225 (1932); Marlowe v. Baird, 301 F.2d 169, 170 (6th
Cir. 1962). See generally 72 C.J.S. Process § 80 at 1117-18 (1951).
9. See, e.g., Hollidge v. Crumpler, 72 F.2d 381, (D.C. Cir. 1934); Harris Foundation,
Inc. v. District Court, 196 Okla. 222, 163 P.2d 976 (1945); Cotton v. Frazier, 170 Tenn. 301,
95 S.W.2d 45 (1936).
10. In certain jurisdictions the privilege may be invoked only by a witness entering the
state voluntarily. See, e.g., Woodward v. Continental Charters, Inc., 203 Misc. 581, 116
N.Y.S.2d 633 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
11. See, e.g., Lamb v. Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222 (1932); Stewart v. Ramsay, 242 U.S. 128
(1916); Murrey v. Murrey, 216 Cal. 707, 16 P.2d 741 (1932), cert. denied, 289 U.S. 740 (1933);
Vaughn v. Boyd, 142 Ga. 230, 82 S.E. 576 (1914). Contra,Lacharite v. District Court, 74 Idaho
65, 256 P.2d 787 (1953); Christian v. Williams, 111 Mo. 429, 20 S.W. 96 (1892); Ellis v.
DeGarmo, 17 R.I. 715, 24 A. 579 (1892). A few jurisdictions have refused to grant nonresident
plaintiffs the right to invoke the rule. See, e.g., Wilson Sewing Mach. Co. v. Wilson, 51 Conn.
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immunity doctrine has not escaped severe criticism' 2 and courts
have often limited its applicability.1 3 The most common exception
to the doctrine was promulgated in Lamb v. Schmitt,'4 where the
Supreme Court held that the immunity rule would not be applied
where the proceeding with regard to which process was issued was
integrally related to the principal suit since service of process in the
second suit would in no way impede, but would rather facilitate, the
administration of justice in the principal suit.'- Emphasizing that
the immunity doctrine was founded not upon the convenience of the
individual claiming its protection, but upon that of the court itself,',
the Court warned "that the privilege should not be enlarged beyond
the reason upon which it [was] founded, and that it should be
extended or withheld only as judicial necessities require[d]."' The
"related proceeding" exception recognized in Lamb has been followed by most jurisdictions,'8 and the Court's warning language has
been echoed frequently by courts seeking to limit application of the
doctrine." At least one state, however, has gone beyond merely restricting the rule's applicability and has completely abrogated it. In
Wangler v. Harvey,2' the New Jersey Supreme Court examined and
discarded the justifications traditionally advanced in support of the
doctrine,2 finding the rule inconsistent with modern concepts of
595 (1884) (dictum); Bishop v. Vose, 27 Conn. 1 (1858); Livengood v. Ball, 63 Okla. 93, 162
P. 768 (1916).
12. See, e.g., Wangler v. Harvey, 41 N.J. 277, 283-85, 196 A.2d 513, 516-18 (1963);
Keeffe & Roscia, Immunity andSentimentality, 32 CORNELL L.Q. 471 (1947); 33 HARV. L. REV.
721, 723 (1920).
13. As noted, some jurisdictions have developed "voluntary" versus "compulsory" attendance tests (see note 10 supra) while others (see note 11 supra) have refused to extend
the rule to nonresident plaintiffs.
14. 285 U.S. 222 (1932).
15. Id. at 227-28.
16. Id. at 225.
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Walker v. Calada Materials Co., 309 F.2d 74 (10th Cir. 1962) (both cases
pertained to judgment allegedly fraudulently obtained by corporation whose officer was
served with process in the second action); Velkov v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 2d 289, 253 P.2d
25 (1953) (defendant appearing in disciplinary proceedings before state bar subject to service
of process in declaratory judgment action arising out of alleged irregularities of oil royalties
assignments on which disciplinary proceedings were also based); Miller v. Miller, 153 Neb.
890, 46 N.W. 2d 618 (1951) (modification of divorce decree to include child support is merely
continuation of divorce proceedings and nonresident husband may not invoke immunity
rule).
19. Gaines v. Superior Court, 196 Cal. App. 2d 749, 753, 16 Cal. Rptr. 909, 911 (1961);
Crusco v. Strunk Steel Co., 365 Pa. 326, 74 A.2d 142, 143 (1950); Anderson v. Ivarsson, 77
Wash. 2d 391, 393, 462 P.2d 914, 915 (1969).
20. 41 N.J. 277, 196 A.2d 513 (1963).
21. Id. at 283-85, 196 A.2d at 516-17.
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justice, 2 and substituted in its stead the doctrine of forum non
conveniens.23 In addition, it has been suggested recently that expanding concepts of in personam jurisdiction could provide a basis
for the total elimination of the immunity doctrine. 24 Historically, a
court was powerless to render a binding judgment on a defendant
physically absent from the territorial jurisdiction of the court. 25 The
immunity rule was therefore necessary to encourage the voluntary
entrance of nonresident witnesses and parties who might otherwise
remain within their own jurisdictions in order to escape service of
process. 21 However, in recent years the concept of in personam jurisdiction has undergone a significant and rapid expansion, and today
a state may constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant on a wide variety of grounds, many of which do not require the defendant's physical presence within the state. 2 Long-arm
statutes authorizing service of process outside a state's borders, and
indeed, virtually anywhere in the world, have been upheld as valid,
providing the constitutional prerequisites for the court's exercise of
jurisdiction exist. 28 Despite this marked expansion of a court's abil22. The Harvey court noted that the rule irrationally favored nonresidents over residents, was in derogation of the right of a creditor to subject his debtor to suit in any jurisdiction where he might be found, and shifted the burden of traveling to a foreign jurisdiction
from the nonresident to the resident party. Id.
23. The court observed that forum non conveniens is principally concerned with "preventing harassment and vexation to the defendant" and allows a court to utilize its own
discretion, rather than an inflexible rule, to prevent imposition upon its trial jurisdiction,
when it determines that in the interest of justice and for the convenience of the litigants and
witnesses the action should be instituted in another forum. Id. at 286, 196 A.2d at 518.
24. Fahy v. Abattoir, 223 Pa. Super. 185, 299 A.2d 323, 325 (1972).
25. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877). The necessity of having the defendant
physically within the court's jurisdiction in order to serve him has been expressly recognized
in several immunity doctrine cases. Hardie v. Bryson, 44 F. Supp. 67, 71 (E.D. Mo. 1942);
Fishbein v. Thornton, 247 S.W.2d 404, 408 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
26. See materials cited in note 8 supra.
27. E.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957) (insurance company
which had done no business on a continuing basis in California other than the single policy
being sued on was subject to the jurisdiction of the California court because of the substantial
connection of the insurance contract with the state); International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945) (systematic activities of defendant corporation within the state sufficient
to constitute "doing business" so as to authorize a finding of presence for purposes of obtaining jurisdiction). For an excellent treatment of the development of constitutional bases for
exercising jurisdiction over non-residents since Pennoyer, see Developments in the
Law-State-CourtJurisdiction,73 HARV. L. REV. 909, 919-48 (1960). See also F. JAMEs, CIVIL
PROCEDURE §§ 12.2-.11 (1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAws §§ 27-52 (1971).
28. In addition to the constitutional "minimum contacts" requirement, see note 26
supra, the Supreme Court has held that due process requires that the defendant receive
"notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise [him] of the pendency
of the action and afford [him] an opportunity to present [his] objections." Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
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ity to obtain and exercise jurisdiction over nonresident defendants,
the immunity doctrine has for the most part remained static, and
virtually no courts have re-examined the issue of its efficacy in light
of modern bases of in personam jurisdiction. 9
The instant court initially examined the historical origins of the
immunity doctrine, citing as its two main purposes the prevention
of disruption of judicial proceedings and the encouragement of nonresident witnesses to appear in aid of the administration of justice.
The court then noted that the development of the doctrine had been
far from uniform and that criticism of the rule had been widespread,
with the result that many jurisdictions had placed limitations on its
operation, and at least one state had ceased to apply it." Relying
on Lamb v. Schmitt and subsequent California decisions 3' applying
the Lamb limitations, the majority delineated three principles restricting the immunity rule: first, that the rule extended no rights
to the nonresident witness but rather existed only for the convenience and benefit of the court before which the nonresident was
appearing; secondly, that the rule applied only where the nonresident witness voluntarily entered the territorial jurisdiction of the
court; and thirdly, that the rule should not be enlarged beyond the
reason upon which it was founded and should be extended or withheld only as judicial necessities required. After observing that California had a strong public policy supporting the right of a creditor
to subject his debtor to suit wherever he could be found and served,
the court noted that the state's recently enacted Code of Civil Procedure32 implemented this policy by authorizing service of process
beyond the state's borders and even outside the United States so
long as made in a manner permitted by California law. The majority
then focused on the third principle of the immunity rule as enunciated in Lamb and noted that as states had gradually extended the
reach of a court's judicial process from the county boundaries to the
state's borders and nonresident witnesses were no longer immune
from a county's process merely by remaining at home, various
courts began to deny application of the rule as between counties.?
29. But see Silfin v. Rose, 17 Misc. 2d 243, 185 N.Y.S.2d 90 (Sup. Ct. 1959) (immunity
doctrine inapplicable where under New York nonresident motorist statute nonresident defendant appearing as witness in principal case could have been served with process without
coming into state).
30. See notes 20-22 supra and accompanying text.
31. Velkov v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. 2d 289, 253 P.2d 25 (1953); Gaines v. Superior
Court, 196 Cal. App. 2d 749, 16 Cal. Rptr. 909 (1961); St. John v. Superior Court, 178 Cal.
App. 2d 794, 3 Cal. Rptr. 535 (1960).
32. See note 4 supra.
33. Citing Christian v. Williams, 111 Mo. 429, 20 S.W. 96 (1892).
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Analogizing to this limitation and the reasoning behind it, the court
observed that California's recently enacted long-arm statutes permit service of process on a defendant virtually anywhere in the
world, provided the requisite subject matter jurisdiction exists. By
virtue of these statutes, the court reasoned, nonresident defendants
were no longer secure in the state or country of their residence from
the reach of California's process and thus the immunity rule could
offer them no encouragement to enter the state in aid of its judicial
administration. Since defendants in the instant case could have
been served at their European places of residence or business, the
court concluded that the immunity rule had no legitimate application to them. Under Lamb, the majority observed, the doctrine
should not be applied where the reason for its application was no
longer valid or where judicial necessity did not require it;"4 therefore,
the court held the immunity doctrine was no longer the law of California. Finally, the majority stated that, since both federal courts
and Florida state courts followed the Lamb limitations on the immunity rule, neither could have any legitimate interest in applying
the rule when the reason for its application had vanished. Furthermore, the court concluded, even if federal and Florida state law
differ from that adopted by California, interstate comity allows the
public policy and law of California to determine the validity of the
service of process on defendants. The dissent, however, observed
that, although process is usually that of the same forum which is
seeking to protect the pending litigation, the instant case involved
two forums. Therefore, the dissent reasoned, the administration of
justice was primarily a concern of the Florida federal district court
and the California courts should not arbitrarily apply their will in
exercising jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant served outside
the state, if such action would be deemed to interfere with the
administration of justice at the place where the service was effected.
Concluding that federal or Florida law should be applied, the dissent examined the Supreme Court cases of Stewart v. Ramsay and
Page v. Macdonald3 and pertinent Florida cases37 and determined
34. Lamb v. Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222, 225 (1932).
35. 242 U.S. 128 (1916) (recognition and acceptance of the immunity doctrine for nonresident suitors as well as for witnesses).
36. 261 U.S. 446 (1923) (a federal court is not foreign and antagonistic to a court of the
state in which it sits within the principle of Stewart v. Ramsay, and therefore a nonresident
defendant served with process from a federal court while attending an action in state court
in the same state may invoke the immunity rule).
37. E.g., State v. Adams, 148 Fla. 426, 4 So. 2d 457 (1941); Rorick v. Chancey, 130 Fla.
442, 178 So. 112 (1937), rev'd on othergrounds, 142 Fla. 290, 195 So. 418 (1938).
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that if plaintiff's suit had been commenced in either the Florida
federal district court or a Florida state court, service of process on
defendants would have beeh quashed under federal and Florida law.
Although recognizing recent expansions of the concept of jurisdiction and admitting that under the California long-arm statute the
court in the instant case had acquired jurisdiction to proceed, the
dissent nevertheless argued that the court's exercise of that jurisdiction placed an unreasonable restraint on the right of the state and
federal courts of Florida to have applied what they deemed to be a
reasonable rule to further judicial proceedings in their courts. 8
The significance of the. instant decision lies more in its precedential impact than in its practical effect. The court's holding subjects foreign corporations having the requisite minimum contacts
with California to service of process in any court 9 in which they may
be present in connection with another action, regardless of whether
the two actions are related. Realistically speaking such a result is
not likely to prove either highly advantageous to plaintiffs or disadvantageous to the nonresident corporations they are seeking to serve
with summons, since California's Code of Civil Procedure permits
service of process on such defendants in numerous other ways. 0 The
majority's reasoning in reaching its conclusions regarding the destruction of the basis for the immunity doctrine by the enactment
of long-arm statutes is logically correct. If a nonresident can legitimately be served outside of California, he is not subjected to a risk
of additional litigation by entering the state, and the immunity
doctrine can offer him no encouragement to come into California in
aid of litigation pending there. The dissent, however, correctly characterized the Florida and federal law position on the immunity doctrine, 4 an issue with regard to which the majority opinion was somewhat evasive. Had the majority analyzed and weighed the competing interests of the California court and the Florida federal district
38. The dissent pointed out that the California court could still obtain jurisdiction over
defendants by serving them at their European places of business or residence pursuant to
§ 413.10(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure, or by attaching any property defendants might
have within the state. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 777, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 343-44.
39. Although the instant case deals with a dual-forum situation, the scope of the holding is obviously intended to encompass the case where the nonresident corporation is suing
or being sued in a California forum and process issues in the second California action.
40. See CAL. CODE OF CIV. PROCEUDa §§ 415.20-.50 (West 1973) (authorizing service by
leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at defendant's office, residence, or place of
business; by mail; or by publication).
41. Page v. Macdonald, 261 U.S. 446 (1922); McDonnell v. American Leduc Petroleums, Ltd., 456 F.2d 1170 (2d Cir. 1972); Rorick v. Chancey, 130 Fla. 442, 178 So. 112 (1937),
rev'd on other grounds, 142 Fla. 290, 195 So. 418 (1938).
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court involved, it might easily have found the degree of disruption
actually caused in the federal action by the serving of process on
defendant 2 during his deposition to be greatly outweighed by California's public policy of allowing creditors to serve their debtors
wherever they might be found. The court, however, failed to engage
in any kind of balancing process, and the force of its argument was
consequently lessened somewhat. Furthermore, the dissent's contention that the instant decision places an unreasonable restraint on
the right of the state and federal courts of Florida to have applied
what they deem to be a reasonable rule to further proceedings in
their courts43 raises the possibility of a full faith and credit clause"
issue. The question becomes whether that clause requires California
to give full faith and credit to the immunity rule as interpreted and
applied by the judicial decisions of Florida. The current test for a
state's right to apply its own law in a conflicts situation seems to
be one of "minimum contacts, 4 5 which California unquestionably
has in the instant case. But it is at least arguable that the instant
conflict should not be governed by that test, for the simple reason
that application of the minimum contacts test here may not yield
the most appropriate results. The California court is clearly interfering with the right of another jurisdiction to regulate the internal
functioning of its own courts. The precedential impact of such a
decision could be significant, and although there seems to be no
previous authority in the area, it is conceivable that a strong constitutional argument could be made against California's right to interfere in what would seem to be so unquestionably an internal concern
of the Florida federal district court. The immunity doctrine may
have outlived its usefulness in light of modern day long-arm statutes, and the California court here has acted logically in abrogating
the rule's operation within the state, but the constitutionality of its
decision with regard to the full faith and credit clause remains open
to question and should be examined more closely in light of the right
of each state to regulate internally the procedures of its own courts.
42. Some jurisdictions denying immunity from service of process have done so at least
partially on the basis that the actual serving of the summons would not create such a distraction that the due administration of justice would be impaired. E.g., Lacharite v. District
Court, 74 Idaho 65, 68, 256 P.2d 787, 789 (1953); cf. Mertens v. McMahon, 334 Mo. 175, 185,
66 S.W.2d 127, 131 (1933).
43. 33 Cal. App. 3d at 777, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 343.
44. "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and
judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe
the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
45. Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954); see R. LEFLAR,
AMERICAN CONFLiaCrs LAW § 73, at 140-41 (1959). See generally id. §§ 56-64.
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Constitutional Law-Right to Counsel-Due
Process Entitles Convicted Indigents to Appointed
Counsel in Petitioning for Discretionary Appeals
Appellant, an indigent whose separate felony convictions'
had been affirmed 2 on appeals as of right,3 sought writs of habeas
corpus in two federal district courts4 alleging that state court refusals to appoint attorneys to assist him in the preparation of petitions
for writs of certiorari in his efforts to obtain further, discretionary
appellate review ' denied him a constitutionally protected right to
counsel. He contended that since the constitution required appointment of counsel on a guaranteed appeal, he should likewise be entitled to representation in seeking an analogous discretionary review
by the state and federal supreme courts. Finding his argument without merit, the district courts refused to issue the writs. On appeal
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, held,
reversed and remanded.' Due process of law requires that an indigent defendant seeking permissive appeal be given the same assistance of court-appointed counsel to which he is entitled in exercising
an initial appeal as of right. Moffitt v. Ross, 483 F.2d 650 (4th Cir.
1. Appellant was twice convicted of forging and uttering forged instruments, first in
Mecklenburg County, N.C. and thereafter in Guilford County, N.C.
2. Affirmance of the Guilford County conviction by the North Carolina Court of Appeals is reported as State v. Moffitt, 11 N.C. App. 337, 181 S.E.2d 184 (1971).
3. Appellate review in each case was by the North Carolina Court of Appeals, to which
an appeal as of right is provided in all criminal cases except those resulting in sentences of
death or life imprisonment, in which guaranteed appeal is provided directly to the North
Carolina Supreme Court. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-27(a), (b) (1969).
4. Petitions for writs of habeas corpus in the Mecklenburg and Guilford County cases
were filed in the United States District Courts for the Western and Middle Districts of North
Carolina, respectively.
5. Following affirmance of the Mecklenburg conviction by the North Carolina Court of
Appeals, the trial court refused to appoint counsel to prepare and file a petition for a writ of
certiorari in the North Carolina Supreme Court. The trial court in the Guilford County case,
however, appointed the Public Defender to apply for a writ of certiorari in the state supreme
court. When the petition was dismissed for lack of a substantial constitutional question, State
v. Moffitt, 279 N.C. 396, 183 S.E.2d 247 (1971), appellant's requests to the trial court and
Court of Appeals for appointment of counsel to prepare and file a writ of certiorari in the
United States Supreme Court was denied.
6. The United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina was
instructed to issue the writ of habeas corpus in the Mecklenburg County case unless the State
provided counsel within a reasonable time. The United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina was instructed to grant the writ of habeas corpus in the Guilford
County case if appellant in his petition to the North Carolina Supreme Court asserted a
substantial federal question reviewable by the United States Supreme Court on a writ of
certiorari.
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1973), cert. granted, U.S. -,
94 S. Ct. 864 (1974).
The convicted indigent's entitlement to appointed counsel on
an initial, guaranteed appeal owes its origin to Douglas v.
California.7 The Supreme Court there held that granting appellate
review of all cases of conviction without appointing counsel for all
indigents' discriminates against some defendants on the basis of
their poverty thus depriving them of equal protection of the laws.'
Relying on the Griffin v. Illinois"' decision that all indigent defendants must be furnished free transcripts on appeal, the Douglas
Court concluded that there can be no equal justice where the quality
of the appeal depends on the defendant's financial status." The
Court expressly reserved, however, the question whether an indigent
seeking further discretionary or mandatory review after affirmance
of his conviction on an initial appeal as of right would likewise be
entitled to counsel. Subsequently, two federal circuits answered the
question negatively.' 2 In Petersv. Cox, 3 the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit, in a per curiam denial of a writ of habeas corpus,
noted simply that Douglas had not extended the right to counsel to
discretionary appeals and that the appellant consequently had no
right to a court appointed attorney. The issue was considered more
fully by the Seventh Circuit in United States ex rel. Pennington v.
Pate.'4 The court concluded that appointment of counsel was not
constitutionally mandated not only because of the narrowness of the
Douglas holding but also because of the Supreme Court's practice
of not granting counsel for the purpose of preparing certiorari petitions 5 and the practical difficulties of implementing an expansion
of state-provided counsel. Some state courts, however, have been
7. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
8. California required appointment of counsel only if the appellate court determined
in an independent investigation of the record that it would be advantageous to the defendant
or helpful to the court to supply counsel. Id. at 355.
9. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1 provides ". . . nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
10. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
11. See id. at 19.
12. In addition see United States ex rel. Coleman v. Denno, 313 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.)
(decided 2 months before Douglas), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 919 (1963) (2 months after Douglas)
(furnishing of counsel at all stages of the state appellate system except in the preparation of
applications for writs of certiorari to the Supreme Court satisfied the Griffin principle).
13. 341 F.2d 575 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 863 (1965).
14. 409 F.2d 757 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970).
15. The current policy of the federal courts, expressed in Doherty v. United States, 404
U.S. 28 (1971), is to require court-appointed counsel to prepare certiorari petitions for indi-
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6
more amenable to such an extension. In Cabanissv. Cunningham,"
the Virginia Supreme Court held that indigents were entitled to
appointed counsel in the preparation of applications for writs of
error by which that court grants discretionary review of trial court
convictions. 7 In some jurisdictions right to counsel has also been
extended to collateral attacks on convictions 5 on the broad premise
that whenever a state affords a direct or collateral remedy a refusal
to supply counsel invidiously discriminates between rich and poor. 9
In the instant case, the court noted initially that, although
access is normally a matter of grace, the highest court of a state
remains the ultimate guardian of the rights of the state's citizens
and may provide, on constitutional questions, the most meaningful
post-conviction review. Citing Douglas, the court reasoned that if
denial of counsel on an intermediate appeal as of right so prejudices
a defendant that the requirements of due process or equal protection
are violated, refusal to appoint counsel to assist in seeking relief in
the highest state court constitutes a comparable deprivation. That
the defendant has already received counsel for one appeal does not
mitigate the harm, the court argued, for his need for legal assistance
is as genuine in seeking discretionary review as it was in exercising
gents. The court based its decision on statutory rather than constitutional grounds, viz. the
Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3006A(c), 3006A(d), 3006A(g), and FED. R. Crv.
P. 44(a). Rule 44(a) provides:
Every defendant who is unable to obtain counsel shall be entitled to have counsel
assigned to represent him at every stage of the proceedings from his initial appearance
before the commissioner or the court through appeal, unless he waives such appointment.
(Emphasis added.) Section 3006A(c) of the Criminal Justice Act provides:
A person for whom counsel is appointed shall be represented at every stage of the
proceedings from his initial appearance before the United States magistrate or the court
through appeal, including ancillary matters.
(Emphasis added.)
16. 206 Va. 330, 143 S.E.2d 911 (1965).
17. Accord, Hutchins v. State, No. 6-Sullivan (Tenn. Sup. Ct., filed Jan. 21, 1974)
(state statutory grounds).
18. In Alaska, appointment of counsel is provided in a post-conviction proceeding if the
petition presents an issue requiring a hearing. Nichols v. State, 425 P.2d 247 (Alas. 1967).
The rule is similar in Idaho. Austin v. State, 91 Idaho 404, 422 P.2d 71 (1966); but cf.
Wilbanks v. State, 91 Idaho 608, 428 P.2d 527 (1967). In Maryland, appointment is by court
rule. Taylor v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 1 Md. App. 23, 226 A.2d 358 (1967). In Missouri, appointed counsel is discretionary but preferred in all cases. State v. Garner, 412
S.W.2d 155 (Mo. 1967). In Kansas, it is required only if substantial questions of law or triable
issues of fact are presented. Carter v. State, 199 Kan. 290, 428 P.2d 758 (1967). See also
Harper v. State, 201 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1967). It is reversible error in Pennsylvania to fail to make
an appointment. Commonwealth v. Hoffman, 426 Pa. 226, 232 A.2d 623 (1967). See also
Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 427 Pa. 395, 235 A.2d 148 (1967) (Pennsylvania statute makes
appointment mandatory).
19. See People ex rel. Rogers v. Stanley, 17 N.Y.2d 256, 217 N.E.2d 636, 270 N.Y.S.2d
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his guaranteed appeal. 0 Further, it is unfair, the court pointed out,
to withhold appointed counsel from the indigent while he is petitioning for further review when more affluent defendants can take
advantage of the second tier of appeals by retaining an attorney.
Recognizing the contrary results of the Pennington and Peters decisions, the court noted merely that due process is an evolving concept
and that the growth of the Bar subsequent to these decisions now
makes possible the further implementation of basic ideas of fairness
that a previous inadequacy of legal resources 2' might have rendered
impractical. The additional burden imposed on the Bar by extending the right to counsel will be slight, the court concluded, since
preparation of a petition for further review can easily be prepared
by the attorney who handled the initial appeal and who is already
familiar with the details of the case. Moreover in present practice,
once certiorari is granted courts ordinarily appoint an attorney for
an unrepresented indigent. Because no logical basis exists for distinguishing guaranteed and discretionary review, due process 22 requires
that a convicted indigent be supplied counsel for the purpose of
preparing a petition requesting permissive appellate review in the
state and federal supreme courts.
By creating a conflict among the Circuit Courts of Appeal, this
decision provides the Supreme Court with the opportunity to determine whether a significant gap in the right to counsel during the
guilt-determining process is to be filled. 23 There is little doubt that
a serious differential exists in the quality of justice available to the
rich and the poor by virtue of the inability of the poor to obtain
573 (1966) (indigent mental patient has a federal constitutional right to counsel in a habeas
corpus proceeding); People v. Monahan, 17 N.Y.2d 310, 217 N.E. 2d 664, 270 N.Y.S.2d 613
(1966) (indigent has federal constitutonal right to counsel in coram nobis proceedings). Based
on these decisions, which were grounded in the equality principle expressed in Griffin and
Douglas, the New York Court of Appeals has held that petitioners are entitled to assigned
counsel at habeas corpus hearings. People ex rel. Jenks v. McMann, 27 App. Div. 2d 580,
275 N.Y.S.2d 399 (1966); People ex rel. Rodriquez v. LaValee, 26 App. Div. 2d 8, 270 N.Y.S.2d
340 (1966); cf. People v. Shipman, 62 Cal. 2d 226, 397 P.2d 993, 42 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1965).
20. "Certiorari practice constitutes a highly specialized aspect of appellate work. The
factors which [a court] deems important in connection with deciding whether to grant
certiorari are certainly not within the normal knowledge and experience of an indigent appellant.
... Boskey, The Right to Counsel in Appellate Proceedings, 45 MINN. L. REv. 783,
797 (1961) (footnote omitted).
21. In reaching its decision in Pennington, the Seventh Circuit relied in part on the
practical difficulties which it believed inherent in extending the right to counsel. 409 F.2d at
760.
22. The court did not indicate why it chose to ground its decision in terms of due process
rather than equal protection, as the Supreme Court did in Douglas.
23. See Boskey, supra note 19, at 797.
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professional legal assistance in the preparation of petitions for writs
of certiorari for presentation to state and federal supreme courts. In
Douglas, the Supreme Court assumed that certain substantial benefits flow automatically from the presence of counsel: examination of
the record, research of the law, and marshalling of arguments. 24
These benefits are particularly critical in the case of certiorari applications since their successful preparation requires a high degree of
skill in identifying and emphasizing factors which motivate courts
to take the statistically unusual step of granting review.2 5 The seriousness of the unrepresented appellant's disadvantage is heightened
by the fact that in preparing his pro se petition, the indigent, who
is not only untrained in spotting legal issues but is also frequently
inarticulate in expressing what he does perceive, is usually exhausting his last chance to have a court look at the fundamental determination of guilty and to directly attack the propriety of the pretrial
and trial proceedings. In Douglas,the Court concluded that the kind
of appeal accorded a defendant cannot hinge on whether he can pay
for the assistance of counsel. By the same rationale, the meaningfulness of a defendant's opportunity to persuade a court to exercise its
discretionary power of review should not depend on his wealth since
the question of the quality of access to the courts, with which the
Douglas opinion dealt, comes into existence even prior to the time
when a discretionary appeal is granted. The petitioning process
places before the court the issue whether the case should be the
subject of review and thus is itself access, the quality of which
depends upon assistance of counsel. That the mere filing of a certiorari application gives the petitioner access to the substantive
decision-making process of the court is further emphasized by the
fact that the United States Supreme Court occasionally disposes of
the merits of the case, as well as the important but procedural
question of whether to grant review, by summary affirmance or
reversal at the same time certiorari is granted. In the sense, however, that the issue is usually whether the defendant is to have an
appeal at all, it is more important that he be represented in the
discretionary situation than in that of the Douglas case, in which
the defendant was at least certain that he would have an appeal.
Furthermore, an anomalous situation is created by supreme courts'
practice of automatically granting counsel to indigents once certiorari is granted, while denying them counsel for an integral, and per24.
25.

372 U.S. at 357-58.
See Boskey, supra note 19, at 797.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

haps the most difficult, part of the appellate process-the petitioning stage. Ultimately, the issue resolves itself into the question
whether the Court will recognize and implement the broad constitutional policy of equalizing to the extent feasible the quality of justice
available to the rich and the poor that Griffin and Douglas seemed
to announce." The broad implications of such a policy, beyond petitions for discretionary appeals, have been suggested elsewhere.,
Attempts to provide a rationale for limiting the policy to transcripts, and to counsel initial appeals as of right-that is, to the
facts of Griffin and Douglas-seem unsatisfactory." No persuasive
reasons seem to exist for applying different standards to discretionary appeals than to guaranteed appeals when the final goal is a fair
criminal procedure. Whether the fact that the indigent has already
been represented by counsel in one appellate review is sufficient for
a finding that he has not been treated unfairly in any fundamental
26. Some commentators and courts have questioned whether Griffin and Douglasstand
for such a general principle. The Seventh Circuit in Pennington, for example, read Griffin
and subsequent transcript cases as requiring only that indigents be allowed access to the
courts and not that the quality of the available review be equal to that of the more affluent.
409 F.2d at 759. The "presence of counsel is not a sine qua non to access to the courts, as
was the availability of the transcript in the Griffin case." 55 MIcH. L. REv. 413, 420 (1957).
The Supreme Court in Douglas, however, indicated that Griffin had a broader import. "In
either case"-whether the denial is of a free transcript or of appointed counsel on an initial
appeal-"the evil is the same: discrimination against the indigent." 372 U.S. at 355. The
critical factor in Griffin, and the tie which binds it with Douglas, is thus the distinctly
disadvantageous treatment given the indigent, and the "access" interpretation of Griffin
must, after Douglas, "be substantially revised, if not abandoned." Kamisar & Choper, infra
note 26, at 13.
The Douglas equality principle is limited to initial appeals, it is argued, because the
"first appeal, the only appeal of right, appears sufficiently more important than any subsequent phase of review-the need for counsel at this step of the appellate process seems
sufficiently more 'acute' than at other stages-that the line may rationally be drawn here."
Id. at 11-12. But once the premise is accepted that the procedure overturned in Douglas
violates either equal protection or due process, it is difficult logically to distinguish the initial
appeal. Instead, the logic adopted by the 6-member Douglas majority leads ineluctably toward granting counsel at subsequent stages. See remarks of Justice Harlan, infra note 28.
27. See Kamisar & Choper, The Right to Counsel in Minnesota: Some Field Findings
and Legal-Policy Observations,48 MINN. L. REv. 1, 4-9 (1963); Note, Right to Aid in Addition
to Counsel for Indigent CriminalDefendants, 47 MINN. L. REv. 1054 (1963); Note, Right to
Counsel in Federal CollateralAttack Proceedings:Section 2255, U. Cm. L. REv. 583 (1963).
With respect to whether the Griffin-Douglasequality principle should be extended to provide
counsel for collateral attacks, it has been suggested that one basis for distinguishing between
them and discretionary appeals is that the latter is part- of the critical guilt-determining
process, while the former is not. Providing counsel for discretionary appeals would thus not
necessitate automatic appointment for habeas corpus or coram nobis proceedings. But see
id.
28. See Kamisar & Choper, supra note 26, at 9-13.

19741

RECENT CASES

sense, and thus has not been deprived of due process of law,
depends on the difficulty with which one's sense of fairness is offended. 9 In deciding what degree of fairness is to be accorded at
different procedural steps in the appellate process, it should be kept
in mind, though, that the extent of the judicial commitment to
"equal justice under law" and, in a very real sense, the meaningfulness of the guarantee itself, is being determined." But whatever the
disposition of the due process claim upon which the Fourth Circuit
grounded its decision, merely pointing to the right to counsel in the
prior review is no answer to an equal protection objection in the
instant case if one accepts the Douglas premise that once the government provides access to the courts it must not place the poor at
a disadvantage in utilizing the remedy. While it is true that practical considerations place limits on the extent to which the logic of
general principles may be pursued, it is clear in this instance, as the
Fourth Circuit noted, that the practical difficulties in instituting
the practices mandated by the logic are not great. In the usual
situation, the only additional strain imposed on our legal resources
will be the preparation of one additional document by an attorney
already familiar with the case. This imposition is far less than that
caused by the extension of counsel to all misdemeanor trials from
29. Justice Harlan, in his dissent to Douglas, contended that the holding of the majority, which was based on equal protection, was more properly understood in terms of due
process. Seeing nothing fundamentally unfair about the California appellate court granting
counsel only to those indigents it thought had arguable appeals, he contended that due
process had not been violated. He stressed, however, that if denial of automatic right to
counsel deprived indigents of due process on initial appeals as of right (which he argued the
majority must have concluded), denial of counsel at subsequent stages would be an equal
deprivation:
What the Court finds constitutionally offensive in California's procedure bears a striking
resemblance to the rules of this Court and many state courts of last resort on petitions
for certiorari or for leave to appeal filed by indigent defendants pro se. . . . Since our
review is generally discretionary, and since we are often not even given the benefit of a
record in the proceedings below, the disadvantages to the indigent petitioner might be
regarded as more substantial than in California . . . . The Court distinguishes our
review from the present case on the grounds that the California rule relates to 'the first
appeal, granted as a matter of right' . . . . But I fail to see the significance of this
difference. Surely, it cannot be contended that the requirements of fair procedure are
exhausted once an indigent has been given one appellate review. . . . Nor can it well
be suggested that having appointed counsel is more necessary to the fair administration
of justice in an initial appeal taken as a matter of right, which the reviewing court on
the full record has already determined to be frivolous, than in a petition asking a higher
appellate court to exercise its discretion to consider what may be a substantial constitutonal claim.
372 U.S. at 365-66. Thus a refusal to recognize the claim of the prisoner in the instant case
would seem to require, in effect, a rejection of the basic premises of Douglas.
30. See Boskey, supra note 19, at 784-85.
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which imprisonment may result-an extension which the Supreme
Court ordered with little hesitation. 31 To extent the right to counsel
to certiorari applications merely completes3 2 the process of recognizing that representation by counsel is a necessary part of any truly
fair criminal procedure.

Constitutional Law -Right of PrivacyPersonality Test Used by School to Identify
Potential Drug Abusers Without Informed
Consent of Parents Violates Student's and
Parents' Right of Privacy
Plaintiffs, an eighth grade student' and his mother, brought
suit against defendant school board2 to enjoin the implementation
of a drug-abuse-prevention program (CPI) in which students were
psychologically tested and then required to participate further in
the program if test results showed them to be potential drug abusers.3 Plaintiffs alleged that the testing program, despite any posi31. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (absent a knowing and intelligent
waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense unless he was represented by counsel).
32. But see Note, Right to Counsel in Federal Collateral Attack Proceedings:Section
2255, 30 U. Cm. L. l1v. 583, 596 (1963) (urging extension of right to counsel to collateral
proceedings).
1. Plaintiff was an eighth grade student at Stewart Junior High School in Norristown,
Montgomery County, Pa.
2. In addition to the Norristown Area School Board, the Montgomery County Commissioners, the Superintendent of Schools, and the principal of the junior high school also were
joined as defendants.
3. The program, entitled Critical Period of Intervention (CPI), was designed as a drug
prevention rather than a drug rehabilitation approach. It was to aid the local school district
in identifying potential abusers, preparing the necessary interventions, identifying resources
to train, aiding the district personnel in remediating the problems, and evaluating the results.
The identification of a potential drug abuser was to be accomplished by requiring students
and their teachers to complete test questionnaires that included inquiry into family relationships and religion, and additionally asked for identification of other students who make
unusual remarks, get into fights, make unusual or inappropriate responses, or have to be
coaxed or forced to work with other pupils, though no instruction is given as to the meaning
of "unusual" or "inappropriate." The second step of the program was to be "intervention"
or "remediation"-the stated purpose of this phase being "to change the cognitive and affective domains of potential drug abusers and other forms of deviant behavior." This intervention was to take several forms, one of which, Guided Group Interaction, specifically was
described as "involuntary" and in which "[d]eviancy is painstakingly defined and discouraged by the group itself." Members are compelled to explain why they have been assigned to

19741

RECENT CASES

tive aspects it might have, invaded their rights of privacy4 by asking
personal questions relating to the family relationship' and by not
specifically assuring confidentiality of test results. Plaintiffs further argued that students are entitled to exercise their constitutional rights and that the program was involuntary in the sense that
the parental consent letter did not provide information sufficient to
enable the making of an informed waiver of the constitutionally
protected right of privacy. 7 Defendants maintained, however, that
the legislature had vested the school board with the discretionary
power to act, to include the testing of its students, and that the
program was justified by the overwhelming public interest in drug
prevention. Rejecting defendants' contentions, the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, held, judgment for plaintiffs." A school's use of a personality test that asks
intimate questions about the family relationship to identify potential drug abusers without first obtaining the consent of properly
informed parents constitutes a violation of the student's and parents' constitutionally protected right of privacy. Merriken v.
Cressman, 364 F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
Although freedom from invasions of privacy by the state can be
traced to Lord Camden's famous opinion over two centuries ago, 9
the right did not receive its constitutionally protected status until
the program. The group may impose sanctions on members, including work detail, withdrawal of past privilege, recommendation to a special unit for intensive training, or the
assignment of more onerous tasks.
4. See note 11 infra. Plaintiffs also claimed that the CPI program would interfere with
and impede their rights of freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and
privilege against self-incrimination.
5. The questionnaires asked questions dealing with the family religion, the family composition, including the reason for the absence of one or both parents, and whether one or both
parents "hugged and kissed me good night when I was small," "tell me how much they love
me," "enjoyed talking about current events with me," and "make me feel unloved."
6. Although the CPI program constantly referred to confidentiality, no specifics were
given in the program itself as to how confidentiality was to be maintained. In fact, the
program, by its own terms, contemplated the development of a "massive data bank" and also
dissemination of data relating to specific students to various school personnel, including
superintendents, principals, guidance counselors, athletic coaches, social workers, PTA officers, and school board members.
7. When suit was first instituted, defendants did not intend to obtain the affirmative
consent of parents to the participation of their children in the CPI program. It was only after
suit was started that defendants offered to change the format so that affirmative parental
consent to participation in the CPI program would be required.
8. The court held that the action was brought to redress deprivation, under color of
state law, on the rights, privileges, and immunities secured by article I, section 9, clause 3
and the first, fourth, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution and that it therefore had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343 (1970).
9. Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B. 1765).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

the United States Supreme Court held, in its 1965 decision in
Griswold v. Connecticut,'0 that the marital relationship is surrounded-by a zone of privacy that is constitutionally protected from
the unnecessary intrusion of state action." More recently, in Roe v.
Wade,' 2 the right of privacy was held to be guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment alone. While Roe extends the right of privacy to
include the right of a woman to decide whether to have an abortion, ,3 neither Roe nor Griswoldoffers much guidance in distinguishing what is privacy from what is not, nor do they delineate exactly
the areas to which the right extends." Indeed, while the courts consistently have upheld the right of privacy with regard to home and
family,'" they have reached conflicting conclusions on the extension
10. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). This is not to say that a right of privacy was not alluded to in
a number of earlier decisions. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961) (fourth
amendment held applicable to state action under the fourteenth amendment; the exclusion
doctrine is an essential part of the right to privacy); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,
478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("[The -makers of our Constitution] conferred, as
against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized man."); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1885)
(protection of fourth and fifth amendments: "The principles laid down in this opinion affect
the very essence of constitutional liberty and security. They reach farther than the concrete
form of the case then before the court, with its adventitious circumstances; they apply to all
invasions on the part of the government and its employes [sic] of the sanctity of a man's
home and the privacies of life. It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his
drawers, that constitutes the essence of personal security, personal liberty and private property, where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some public offence-it is
the invasion of this sacred right which underlies and constitutes the essence of Lord Camden's
judgment.").
11. Justice Douglas, writing for a plurality of the Court, collected various established
constitutional doctrine§ that could be considered to protect an interest in privacy-the first,
third, fourth, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments-then concluded that their sum resulted in a "penumbral" privacy right. 381 U.S. at 484. Justice Goldberg, on the other hand,
in a concurring opinion, chose to view the right of privacy as a fundamental personal liberty
that is protected from abridgement by the federal government or the states by the fifth and
fourteenth amendments, as supported by the ninth amendment. Id. at 492-93.
12. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
13. Justice Blackmun, delivering the opinion of the Court, stated that the right of
privacy is founded in the fourteenth amendment's concept of personal liberty and restrictions
on state action and is broad "enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
terminate her pregnancy." Id. at 153.
14. See Note, Privacy in the First Amendment, 82 YALE L.J. 1462, 1475-76 (1973).
15. "[lIt is apparent that the right of privacy is constitutionally protected. It is when
and how which create the problems." Roberts v. Clement, 252 F. Supp. 835, 848 (E.D. Tenn.
1966) (Darr, J., concurring).
16. Both the Griswoldand Roe cases fall into this category. See also Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (administrative search of the home); Murphy v. Houma Well
Serv., 413 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1969) (search of parentage to determine legitimacy of children
for priorities under will not allowed); Babbitz v. McCann, 310 F. Supp. 293 (E.D. Wis. 1970)
(woman has private right to decide whether to bear her unquickened child); Buchanan v.
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of this right to other areas.' 7 Whether the family relationship is at
issue or not, however, a balancing test has evolved and is applied
when valid governmental purposes are in conflict with established
constitutional rights.'" If the constitutional right concerned is found
to be fundamental, a strict standard is applied, and the state is
required to come forward with overwhelming justification for its
action-a compelling state interest.'9 To a large extent, whether or
not the right is fundamental is often determinative of whether the
state action will be sustained. Moreover, the waiver of a fundamental right must meet the strict test of being "voluntary, knowing, and
intelligently made." 0 While student rights in general have been the
subject of much litigation dealing with the existence of various funBatchelor, 308 F. Supp. 729 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (sodomy law declared unconstitutional after a
consenting, married couple challenged it).
17. See, e.g., Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 981 (1966) (accused does not have same rights in public toilet as he would have in his
own home); Thom v. New York Stock Exch., 306 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (law requiring fingerprinting as a prerequisite to employment with SEC related firms upheld); City of
Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 466 P.2d 225, 85 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1970) (statute
requiring disclosure of financial interests of public officials is an unconstitutional invasion of
right of privacy); 23 VAND. L. REv. 1359 (1970); note 24 infra.
18. See, eg., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (private right to terminate pregnancy
held superior, within certain limits, to state's interest in protecting parental life); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (marital privacy superior to state purpose of controlling
use of contraceptives); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (state purpose of preventing breaches of basic concepts of sexual decency must yield when it discriminates racially);
NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288 (1964) (state requirements for corporate registration supply
no basis for mandatory disclosure of all members of corporate organization); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (state concern for competency and fitness of teachers held not
sufficient to require disclosure of all organizational memberships of individual teachers);
Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (local ordinance regulating corporations held
not sufficient to require disclosure of all members of corporate association); Barenblatt v.
United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959) (balancing of public and private interests when first
amendment rights present).
19. This approach to balancing especially was evident in Roe, in which the Court found
the state's interest in the health of the mother to be compelling only after the first trimester
of pregnancy, at which time the mortality rate in abortion starts to exceed the mortality rate
in natural childbirth, and after this point, a state may regulate the abortion procedure to the
extent that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of the health
of the mother. After the second trimester, the state's interest in the then viable unborn child
becomes compelling, and the state is given even greater latitude in its actions, to the point
of being able to proscribe abortion during that period except when it is necessary to preserve
the health or life of the mother. 410 U.S. at 163-64. A similar approach is followed in the area
of equal protection.
20. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972) (assumed same standard
for waiver in a property right case as in a criminal case). See also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S.
67, 95 (1972) ("[A] waiver of constitutional rights in any context must, at the very least, be
clear."); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (criminal context: "Waivers of
constitutional rights . . . must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness
of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.").
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damental rights and their balancing with the in loco parentis"
power of the school, the question of a student's right of privacy has
been litigated infrequently. The principal case upholding student
rights, Tinker v. Des Moines School District,22 was decided on the
basis of the first amendment protection of freedom of expression,2
and the most frequently litigated area of student rights, that of the
"long hair" cases, only in a few instances has been argued on the
basis of a constitutionally protected right of privacy, with inconsistent results based substantially on whether the concept of privacy
applied rather than on whether a fundamental right of privacy existed.2 4 Generally, however, whatever the right asserted by the student in opposition to the powers of the school board, a balance
consistently has been struck after determining whether a fundamental right is concerned and whether the school board consequently
21. It is generally recognized that schools have certain discretionary powers over the
students in their charge, commonly referred to as their in loco parentis power, which invests
them with many of the rights, duties, and responsibilities of a parent.
22. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
23. Students, including the plaintiff, planned to wear black armbands to school in
protest of the hostilities in Viet Nam. The principals of the schools became aware of the plan
and adopted a policy that participating students would be asked to remove the armbands,
and if a student refused, he would be suspended until he returned without it. The district
court held the measure constitutional as reasonable in order to prevent disturbance of school
discipline. The Supreme Court, Justice Fortas writing for the majority, found the fundamental first amendment freedom of speech and expression at issue and therefore applied a stricter
standard of justification for the school action, holding the action violative of that right and
therefore unconstitutional: "It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the school house gate." Id.
at 506.
24. See, e.g., Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1283 (1st Cir. 1970) (expansion of
right of marital privacy of Griswold to include student who wore his hair "falling loosely about
the shoulders" rejected); Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213, 218 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 850 (1970) (contention by students and their parents that constitutional right of privacy
was impaired by school board's prohibition of male students' long hair held without merit);
Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970) (right to wear
one's hair at any desired length is an ingredient of personal freedom whether it is designated
as being within the "penumbras" of Griswold or the additional fundamental rights encompassed within the ninth amendment); Black v. Cothren, 316 F. Supp. 468 (D. Neb. 1970)
(fundamental right of privacy no longer open to question, and that right includes wearing
one's hair at the length and in the manner he chooses).
More often the question of privacy in a school situation has come up in a fourth amendment search and seizure context. The courts have been divided as to whether searches by
school officials are subject to the restrictions of the fourth,amendment. See, e.g., State v.
Baccino, 282 A.2d 869 (Del. Super. Ct. 1971) (fourth amendment restrictions apply but
"reasonable suspicion" sufficient justification due to in loco parentis doctrine); People v.
Stewart, 313 N.Y.S.2d 253 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1970) (school administrator not acting in
concert with the police is a private person to whom fourth amendment prohibitions do not
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must come forward to show a compelling interest.15 The right of
privacy as it relates to psychological tests and the confidentiality of
the resulting information has been a subject of concern on a number
2
of fronts,2" but this concern has produced no significant litigation. 1
In 1965, only two days after the Supreme Court delivered its decision in Griswold expanding the constitutional protection of privacy,
the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights heard testimony
relating to the psychological testing of federal government employees.? The inquiry directed itself to the constitutional propriety of29
the areas to which the psychological-test questions are directed,
the reliability of the test results,3" and the problems of confidentialE.

25. See cases cited in E. BOLMEIER, LEGAL LIMITS OF AUTHORITY OVER THE PuPIL (1970);
BOLMEIER, THE SCHOOL IN THE LEGAL STRUCTURE 223-94 (2d ed. 1973); L. PETERSON, R.

& M. VOLz, THE LAW AND PUBLIC SCHOOL OPERATION 371-427 (1968); Phay, supra
note 24; Sealey, The Courts and Student Rights-Substantive Matters, in EMERGING PROBLEMS IN SCHOOL LAW 23-50 (1972).
26. Justice Brandeis was one of the first to voice this concern in his dissenting opinion
in Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 471 (1928). Justice Brandeis predicted that
"[aldvances in the psychic and related sciences may bring means of exploring unexpressed
beliefs, thoughts and emotions." Id. at 474. He than asked, "Can it be that the Constitution
affords no protection against such invasions of individual security?" Id. He subsequently
answered his own question:
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit
of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings,
and of his intellect. . . . They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their
thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the most valued
by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government
upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a
violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 478.
27. See Sherrer & Roston, Some Legal and Psychological Concerns About Personality
Testing in the PublicSchools, 30 FED. B.J. 111 (1971).
28. Hearingson PsychologicalTesting Proceduresand the Rights of FederalEmployees
Before the Subcomm. on ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1965) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
29. Monroe H. Freedman, associate professor of law at George Washington University,
consultant to the Educational Testing Service, and member of the Test Development and
Research Committee of the Law School Admission Test, testified that people answering some
of the questions contained in one of the most widely-used psychological tests, the Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory, were clearly not "secure in their persons" within the
meaning of the fourth amendment. Id. at 172.
30. Martin L. Gross, author of The Brain Watchers, in his testimony before the subcommittee quoted Dr. John Dollard, professor of psychology at Yale University: "There may be
exceptions unknown to me, but generally speaking, projective tests, trait scales, interest
inventories, or depth interviews are not proved to be useful in selecting executives, or salesmen, or potential delinquents, or superior college students. If not known to be reliable and
valid, personality tests should be absolutely avoided because they can do much harm." Id.
at 33. Mr. Gross went on to state that such tests were "inaccurate and dangerous psychological tools." Id. at 42.
ROSSMILLER,
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ity to which this information would be subject. 3' Later, the chairman of that subcommittee wrote that Congress has received complaints of government invasions of privacy in the form of "intrusive
questionnaires unnecessary to the needs of government" and of psychological tests; the chairman concluded that the majority of these
grievances constitute violations of constitutional3 2guarantees contained in the first, fourth, and fifth amendments.
The instant court first addressed plaintiffs' contention that the
allegedly involuntary program was a violation of their right of privacy.33 While recognizing that Griswold and Roe did establish such
a constitutionally protected right, the court did not feel it necessary
to expand the interpretation of those cases' precedential value beyond the family relationship context in which they were decided.
Consequently, the court examined the instant factual situation as
it related to family relationships and child rearing, finding the questionnaire to be highly personal in nature and designed to probe
directly into the individual's family relationship. The court concluded that it could look upon any invasion of the family relationship as a violation of the constitutional right of privacy. Next, the
court dismissed any notion that plaintiff child's status as a student
and a minor would invalidate his constitutional right of privacy.
The court stated that the right of privacy should be protected with
the same deference as was the right of speech in Tinker34 and that
students are entitled to exercise their constitutional rights. Whether
parents can waive the child's constitutional rights without his consent was the next question facing the court, but it did not deem it
necessary to provide an answer at this time. Instead, the court concluded that the information in the parental consent letters by the
school board was not sufficient to constitute the "informed consent"
required for waiver of constitutionally protected rights; the letters
were characterized as "selling devices" that failed to mention potential negative effects of the testing.3 Finding little precedent regarding personality testing and its confidentiality, the court nevertheless
31. Id. at 176. See also Countryman, The Diminishing Right of Privacy: The Personal
Dossier and the Computer, 49 TEXAS L. REV. 837 (1971).
32. Ervin, Privacy and the Constitution,50 N.C.L. REv. 1016, 1017 (1972).
33. The court later addressed plaintiffs' contention that other constitutional rights

would be violated by the CPI program. See note 4 supra. It concluded, however, that the
program would violate no constitutional rights except that of privacy.
34. See notes 22 and 23 supra and accompanying text.
35. See note 20 supra. The court noted that the letters sent to parents only presented
the affirmative side of the picture concerning the tests, purposely not mentioning possible
stigmatizing, scapegoating, or confidentiality problems.
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stated that some of the problems about which the parents were not
informed were so potentially harmful that the standard for informed
consent ought to be comparable to that obtained by a doctor prior
to surgery. The court expressed doubts as to the veracity of the test
results and the qualifications of the personnel administering the
program and stated that the alleged confidentiality of the information was lost as soon as it was reported to the school superintendent.
The court considered the possible "labelling" of the child to be the
most serious problem presented, given the lack of confidentiality
and the lack of experience among those administering the program.
Potentially permanent damage to the child, the court felt, might be
created by stigmatization among peers and by a "self-fulfilling
prophecy" potentiality-the tendency of a child labelled as a potential drug user to decide to conform to that label. The magnitude of
this danger led the court to conclude that the margin of error of such
a program would have to be "almost nil" 3 for the student to be
adequately protected. Reasoning that a balancing test was in order
because an invasion of privacy was at issue, the court weighed the
recognized dangers of the program against the asserted discretionary power of a school board to act and held that through the CPI
program the individual would stand to lose more than society would
gain in its fight against drugs. Finding that the school board had
not sustained its burden of showing a compelling interest that outweighed plaintiffs' right of privacy, the court enjoined the program
for failing to meet constitutionally demanded standards.
The instant court cautiously restricted its discussion of the constitutionally protected right of privacy to the realm of family relationships, 37 putting substantial emphasis on the intimate nature of
the questions in the CPI questionnaire and their relation to the
family. Therefore, while the court at first glance would seem to have
recognized a student's right of privacy, it in reality only finds a
violation of the right of familial privacy-one member of the family
being a student. In fact, the court specifically avoids the more potent question of plaintiff student's own rights, both as to the right
of privacy itself and as to whether his parents could waive his rights
without his consent. In the area of student rights, this decision
undoubtedly will join the long list of cases supporting the proposition that student rights, at least when they concern fundamental
freedoms, outweigh the in loco parentis discretionary power of a
36.
37.

364 F. Supp. at 920.
See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
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school board. 8 Indeed, this is one of only a few cases in which the
question of a student's right of privacy has been addressed.3 9 On the
other hand, the precedential value of the decision in the area of
student rights is weakened for much the same reason that it is in
the area of privacy-it is based substantially on the right of privacy
in the family relationship rather than on the right of the individual
student. Although the decision's impact on the development of the
concepts of privacy and student rights is questionable, the effect of
this decision on the power of a school over its curriculum may be
substantial. The case reasonably could be said to stand for the
proposition that when a school program threatens the fundamental
right of privacy of the family, it will be held unconstitutional; therefore, the holding could be extended to prohibit other programs that
represent similar invasions into the family relationship. If a personality test asking family-related questions is held to violate this right,
then conceivably a sex education course might be said to constitute
an equal invasion, though the instant case could be distinguished
on the basis of the extraordinary potentiality of harm to the students that the court foresaw in the CPI program. The prime importance of the court's decision, however, lies in its potential impact
on the field of psychological or personality testing. Certainly, drugabuse tests are not the only psychological tests that ask probing and
intimate questions; most psychological tests' expressed purpose
demand that they do so. 4" They are usually designed to be answered
with instantaneous, reflex responses-responses that inevitably result in an invasion of private thoughts." While other psychological
tests might not probe so directly or deeply into family relationships
as does the CPI program, it is inevitable, given the purpose of most
of these tests, that some question would be related substantially to
this area, even if only indirectly. Though the finding of a lack of
confidentiality in the program was a major factor in the court's
holding that an invasion of constitutionally protected privacy had
occurred, there is every reason to believe that similar tests would be
subject to the same infirmities. Indeed, one of the major concerns
of writers addressing the question of psychological testing has been
the danger of the test results losing their confidentiality either by
means of simple disclosures, susceptibility to subpoena power, or
accessibility of the data banks on which the whole concept of many
38.
39.
40.
41.

See notes 23 and 24 supra. See also cases cited in Sealey, supra note 25, at 41-50.
See note 24 supra.
Hearings, supra note 28, at 170; Sherrer & Rosten, supra note 27, at 115.
Hearings, supra note 28, at 169; Sherrer & Rosten, supra note 27, at 111.

19741

RECENT CASES

uniform psychological tests are predicated.4 2 Thus, while the instant
decision only somewhat broadens the scope of family-relationship
privacy and merely lends support to other decisions affording students the same fundamental constitutional rights enjoyed by other
citizens, it provides perhaps the first signal that the psychological
testing phenomenon, which invades the lives of literally all Americans, may not in the future enjoy the same immunity from constitutional strictures that it has in the past.

Taxation-Capital Gains-Payment to Lessor in
Satisfaction of Lessee's Obligation to Restore
Premises Appears to Create Taxable Gain From
the Sale or Exchange of Property Pursuant to
Section 1231
Taxpayer-lessor' reported payment received in satisfaction of a
lessee's obligation to restore' the leased premises to their pre-lease
condition 3 as long-term capital gain 4 pursuant to section 1231
42. Sherrer and Rosten in their article propose that legislation be enacted to ensure that
the results of psychological tests will not be released to third parties without the informed
consent of the student or his parents. Note 27 supra, at 114. They enumerate some of the
potential problems of confidentiality: data banks (id. at 115-16); results becoming a permanent part of the student's record, available to employers eventually (id. at 116); and the
problems inherent in any program instituted by the school on the basis of these results (id.

at 117). See also Hearings,supra note 28, at 176.
1. Taxpayer, a corporation engaged in the trade or business of renting real estate,
acquired the property in question-a building with offices and a theater-in 1944 subject to
an existing lease of the theater to the Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS), which used
it for radio broadcasting purposes.
2. The lease negotiated between taxpayer and CBS in 1947 at the expiration of the prior
owner's lease and all successive leases contained substantially the following restoration provision, which was included in the indenture covering the period from July 15, 1958 through
December 31, 1963 and which is the subject of the payment in issue:
Fourth: -At the expiration or other termination of the term hereby granted, the tenant
shall and will leave the said premises and the theatre whole and in good order and
condition . . . reasonable wear and tear and damage by the elements excepted . . .

provided, however, that the tenant shall restore the premises substantially to the condition in which they existed on November 14, 1947 . . . and the tenant shall fully indemnify the landlord for every and all costs and expenses of whatsoever name or nature that
may be required for the purposes of reinstating the premises to said condition.
3. CBS altered the interior of the theater extensively to convert it from a legitimate
theater into one suitable for television broadcasts. Changes included removal of
approximately 300-400 theater seats, all carpeting, chandeliers, and stage curtains, the extension of the stage area, a change in floor level, construction of control rooms, the installation
of thousands of feet of electrical wiring, and the alteration of bathrooms and the heating
system.
4. Prior to December 31, 1963, CBS determined as a matter of corporate policy to
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of the Internal Revenue Code, which provides capital gains treatment for gains from the sale, exchange, or involuntary conversion
of certain property used in the trade or business of the taxpayer.
Taxpayer contended that the transaction constituted a "sale or exchange" as an alternative to its other argument that the payment
compensated for the destruction and removal of parts of the premises and therefore qualified as gain derived from involuntary conversion of the property. 7 Rejecting taxpayer's contentions,8 the Tax
Court 9 characterized the payment as consideration for modification "' of the lessee's contractual obligation to restore the premises
eliminate or update restoration clauses from leases it held for theaters in New York because
of concern over rising construction costs, which made it difficult to predict the ultimate cost
of fulfilling its obligation to restore premises leased by it. In 1964 CBS negotiated with
taxpayer to update the restoration clause in the upcoming new lease and to settle on an
amount needed to restore the theater from its current to its 1947 condition. The parties agreed
on $125,000 as a compromise figure. The adjusted basis of the entire building at the time of
the settlement was $93,333.51; taxpayer reported the excess of the payment over the adjusted
basis of $31,666.49 as long-term capital gain.
5. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 1231.
6. Section 1231 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides in relevant part:
(a) General rule. -If, during the taxable year, the recognized gains on sales or
exchanges of property used in the trade or business, plus the recognized gains from the
compulsory or involuntary conversion (as a result of destruction in whole or in part, theft
or seizure, or an exercise of the power of requisition or condemnation or the threat or
imminence thereof) of property used in the trade or business and capital assets held for
more than 6 months into other property or money, exceed the recognized losses from such
sales, exchanges, and conversions, such gains and losses shall be considered as gains and
losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets held for more than 6 months.
The definition of "property used in the trade or business" is provided in subsection (b):
(1) Generalrule. -The term 'property used in the trade or business' means property used in the trade or business, of a character which is subject to the allowance for
depreciation provided in section 167, held for more than 6 months, and real property
used in the trade or business, held for more than 6 months, which is not-(A) property
of a kind which would properly be includible in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand
at the close of the taxable year; (B) property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business; or, (C) a copyright, a literary,
musical, or artistic composition, or similar property, held by a taxpayer described in
paragraph (3) of Section 1221 . ...
7. Taxpayer had initially reported the gain on its corporate tax return as long-term
capital gain resulting from involuntary conversion of the property.
8. The Tax Court peremptorily dismissed taxpayer's contention that the property had
been involuntarily converted, finding instead that the taxpayer voluntarily had agreed to the
conversion of its property. The court was further unable to find a sale or exchange of anything,
particularly in view of the fact that much of the property removed from the theater would
have been fully depreciated prior to the negotiation of the settlement. Sirbo Holdings, Inc.,
57 T.C. 530, 537-38 (1972).
9. The Commissioner had noted a deficiency in taxpayer's tax liability. Section 6213
of the Code provides that an appeal from a deficiency assessment should be taken to the Tax
Court. INT. Ray. CODE OF 1954, § 6213.
10. 57 T.C. at 538.
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and upheld the commissioner's ruling that the payment yielded
ordinary income. On appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
held, vacated and remanded. Payment to a lessor in satisfaction of
a lessee's obligation to restore leased premises to pre-lease condition
appears to be entitled to capital gains treatment as a sale or exchange of property pursuant to section 1231 of the Internal Revenue
Code." The court reserved its final decision, however, pending resolution by the Tax Court of the latter's inconsistent treatment of
restoration payments. Sirbo Holdings, Inc. v. Commissioner, 476
F.2d 981 (2d Cir. 1973).
The preferential tax treatment accorded gains from certain
transfers of business property under section 1231 has occasioned
2
extensive litigation over what constitutes a "sale or exchange,"'
particularly when the property allegedly sold or exchanged is an
intangible such as a contract right. 3 While courts generally have
11. The court agreed with the Tax Court that taxpayer had failed to establish involuntary conversion. Judge Friendly reasoned that the conversion was voluntary in 2 respects:
first, in that taxpayer had leased the property willingly to CBS with the understanding that
it might be converted for use into a television studio; and secondly, in that the taxpayer had
agreed to accept a cash payment rather than enforce the restoration clause. 476 F.2d at 98586. The court relied on both indications of voluntariness in distinguishing the instant case
from those on which taxpayer relied: United States v. Pate, 254 F.2d 480 (10th Cir. 1958)
(destruction of taxpayer's building under circumstances beyond his control-through negligence of another-constituted involuntary conversion); Grant Oil Tool Co. v. United States,
381 F.2d 389 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (irretrievable loss of oil-drilling tools by lessee constituted involuntary conversion); Walter A. Henshaw, 23 T.C. 176 (1954) (damage to oil leases through
negligence of third party constituted involuntary conversion); Guy L. Waggoner, 15 T.C. 496
(1950) (taxpayer's property damaged while leased to the United States under threat of condemnation involuntarily converted).
12. The courts have been forced to determine judicially the transactions covered by the
"sale or exchange" language because of congressional failure to define the phrase anywhere
in the Internal Revenue Code. See, e.g., Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260
(1958) (assignment of oil payment right in return for $600,000 not a sale or exchange); Sanders
v. Commissioner, 225 F.2d 629 (10th Cir. 1955) (release of claim for damages in return for
payment not a sale or exchange); Commissioner v. Golonsky, 200 F.2d 72 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 939 (1952) (surrender of lease by tenant in return for payment by lessor a
sale or exchange); Jones v. Corbyn, 186 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1950) (release of exclusive insurance agency contract for payment a sale); Philadelphia Quartz Co. v. United States, 374 F.2d
512 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (cancellation of liability of bailee for return of steel drum in return for
deposit a sale); Hamilton & Main, Inc., 25 T.C. 878 (1956) (cancellation of lessee's duty to
restore leased premises to pre-lease condition for payment a sale); Nehi Beverage Co., 16 T.C.
1114 (1951) (cancellation of agent's liability for pop bottles in return for deposits not a sale).
For general discussions of the problems of the capital gains-ordinary income dichotomy see
Surrey, DefinitionalProblems in Capital Gains Taxation, 69 HAuv. L. REv. 985 (1956); Comment, The Troubled Distinction Between Capital Gain and OrdinaryIncome, 73 YALE L.J.
693 (1964).
13. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Pittston Co., 252 F.2d 344 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 357
U.S. 919 (1958) (surrender of exclusive purchasing right for payment not a sale or exchange);
Jones v. Corbyn, 186 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1950); Hamilton & Main, Inc., 25 T.C. 878 (1956).
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recognized that a contract right is "property" within the broad sense
of the word,' 4 they have utilized two different approaches to analyze
the "sale or exchange" requirement.' 5 The first, which focuses on the
nature of the contract right being considered, is applied to determine whether the contract right allegedly sold constituted an independent interest in an underlying capital asset. The more traditional approach, typified by Commissioner v. Starr Brothers,'" focuses, however, on the survival of the contract right as valuable
property after its transfer. Generally, utilization of this latter approach has proved fatal to a taxpayer attempting to show a sale or
exchange in that the courts have characterized the transaction as a
release of an obligation that extinguishes rather than transfers any
rights.' 7 The Second Circuit traditionally subscribed to the survival
approach, which denies capital gains treatment to payments for
contract rights such as cancellation of leases'" and distributors
agreements," until it rendered its decision in Commissioner v.
2 ' The taxpayer in Ferrer, who
Ferrer.
held a lease on the exclusive
dramatic production rights to a novel, released his rights in return
for a stated percentage of the film proceeds. In determining whether
the proceeds received constituted capital gain or ordinary income
under the predecessor to section 1221 of the 1954 Code, 2' Judge
See also Chirelstein, CapitalGain and the Sale of a Business Opportunity: The Income Tax
Treatment of Contract Termination Payments, 49 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1964); Note,
DistinguishingOrdinaryIncome from Capital Gain Where Rights to FutureIncome are Sold,
69 HARV. L. REv. 737 (1956).
14. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transport, Inc., 364 U.S. 130, 134-35
(1960); Commissioner v. Starr Bros., Inc., 204 F.2d 673, 674 (2d Cir. 1953); Jones v. Corbyn,
186 F.2d 450, 453 (10th Cir. 1940).
15. See Eustice, ContractRights, Capital Gain, andAssignment of Incomes-the Ferrer
Case, 20 TAx L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1964). But see Chirelstein supra note 13 (finds 3 basic approaches
to the problems).
16. 204 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1953). The taxpayer in Starr Bros. released an exclusive
dealership right in return for a cash payment. The court found no sale or exchange because
the contract rights "were not transferred to the promisor; they merely came to an end and
vanished." Id. at 674.
17. Commissioner v. Pittston Co., 252 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1958) (payment for surrender
of exclusive right to buy coal extinguished rather than transferred right); General Artists
Corp. v. Commissioner, 205 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1953) (assignment of exclusive booking-agency
contract to new agent, who wrote new contract with performer, released rather than transferred rights).
18. Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941).
19. See, e.g., Leh v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1958) (surrender of gasoline
requirements contract in return for payment not a sale or exchange); Commissioner v. Starr
Bros., Inc., 204 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1953).
20. 304 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1962).
21. INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 117(a), (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1221).
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Friendly rejected the traditional survival test and focused instead
on the nature of the contract rights held by the taxpayer before
transfer. Partially basing his rejection of the survival test on apparent congressional disapproval of prior Second Circuit decisions,"2
Judge Friendly suggested that classification of a contract right as
property capable of being sold or exchanged should be determined
by the existence of an equitable interest or estate in specific property2 - and held that the motion picture production right constituted
an equitable interest capable of sale. Speculation that Ferrer
marked a turning point in the Second Circuit's treatment of the sale
or exchange of contract rights24 was diminished substantially when
the court apparently returned to the survival test in Billy Rose's
Diamond Horseshoe, Inc. v. United States.2 Taxpayer in Billy Rose
leased its building to the National Broadcasting Company for use
as a television theater, including in the lease a provision that required the lessee to restore the theater to its pre-lease condition
upon termination of the lease. Prior to expiration of the lease, the
parties compromised on $300,000 as the value of the property removed and as satisfaction for extensive alterations made to the
interior of the theater by the lessee. The restoration payments having been made with a series of notes on account, the taxpayer attempted to report the income from the notes on the installment
26
basis as provided by section 453(b) of the Internal Revenue Code.
Applying the survival test, the court held that the transaction did
not constitute a "sale or other disposition" of personal property as
required by section 453 and therefore could not be reported on the
installment basis. Although section 453 refers to "sales or other
dispositions" and section 1231 is couched in terms of "sales or exchanges," the court indicated that the test for both should be the
same and distinguished Ferreron the grounds that it involved the
release of a substantial contract right that could be sold to a third
party whereas the right to restoration in Billy Rose had no value to
22. The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 included a new provision, § 1241, which provides that amounts received by a lessee for the cancellation of a distributor's agreement
should be considered as amounts received in exchange for that lease or agreement.
23. 304 F.2d at 130.
24. Chirelstein, supra note 13, at 19-25; Eustice, supra note 15, at 4-15.
25. 448 F.2d 549 (2d Cir. 1971). For comments on Billy Rose see Case Note, 14 Bos.
COL. IND. & COM. L. REv. 183 (1972); Second Circuit Note-1970 Term, 47 ST. JOHN's L.
Rav. 415 (1972).
26. Section 453 generally provides that a taxpayer who sells or otherwise disposes of
property on the installment plan may report his income in the year in which it is received as
long as the payments received in the year of sale do not exceed 30% of the selling price. INT.
REV. CODE: OF 1954, § 453.
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parties other than the lessee and lessor.27 Despite Billy Rose's indication that the release of a right to restoration is not a sale under
sections 453 and 1231 of the Internal Revenue Code, the Tax Court
has held in a recent decision, Boston Fish Market Corp.,21 that
capital gains treatment should be accorded to restoration payments
and noted that these payments generally have "been regarded as
having been received in sale or exchange of the unrestored prop29
erty."
Having initially agreed with the Tax Court that taxpayer had
failed to establish an involuntary conversion of its property into
money, 30 the instant court turned to consider the alternative contention that the transaction constituted a sale or exchange of property
used in the trade or business. Judge Friendly, speaking for the court,
first disapproved of the Tax Court's reliance on Billy Rose,3 ' asserting that the Second Circuit's declaration that the survival test
would apply to preclude capital gains treatment under either section 453 or section 1231 was too narrow an approach, at least as
applied to section 1231. He noted that the covenant to restore,
which could not qualify as property used in taxpayer's trade or
business, was not the sole basis of the capital gains claim, thus
making the extinguishment of that obligation nondeterminative.
Instead, he reasoned that the claim was based in part on the ground
that the restoration payment was compensation for the removal and
destruction of leased property over the years. If that compensation
had been provided for literally in the lease, in lieu of the restoration
clause, it would have been treated as proceeds from a sale or exchange.3 2 To accord different treatment to substantially identical
transactions would, he concluded, seem to be an adherence to form
over substance. Secondly, the court found the inconsistent results
reached by the Tax Court in the instant case and in Boston Fish
3
Market, which was decided two months later, 33 to be unacceptable. 1
27. 448 F.2d at 552.
28. 57 T.C. 884 (1972).
29. Id. at 889. In support of its statement, the court cited Washington Fireproof Bldg.
Co., 31 B.T.A. 824 (1934), and Hamilton & Main, Inc., 25 T.C. 878 (1956), which held that
restoration payments made to a lessor in satisfaction of the lessee's obligation to restore were
received from the sale or other disposition or the sale or exchange of a capital asset.
30. See note 11 supra.
31. See text accompanying notes 25-57 supra.
32. Judge Friendly cited Washington Fireproof Bldg. Co., 31 B.T.A. 824 (1934), and
Hamilton & Main, Inc., 25 T.C. 878 (1956), in support of his statement. See note 29 supra.
33. Taxpayer moved immediately for reconsideration after the decision in Boston Fish
Market, but its motion was denied without explanation.
34. The court found the inconsistency unacceptable on grounds that the Commissioner
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Speculating that the Tax Court's reliance on Billy Rose in the instant case and its subsequent failure to reconcile its instant decision
with Boston Fish Market resulted from that court's previous ruling
that under certain circumstances it would be bound by decisions of
a court of appeals, 5 Friendly suggested that Billy Rose was not
binding on the Tax Court in the instant case. Pointing out that Billy
Rose dealt with the interpretation of "the sale or other disposition
of property" as employed in section 453 rather than with "sale or
exchange" as employed in section 1231, the court reasoned that
Congress might have intended different meanings for the two
phrases, particularly in light of the different purposes of the two
provisions. 6 Moreover, the instant court expressly termed as dicta
the language of Billy Rose that similarly construed the "sale or other
disposition" and "sale or exchange" requirements. Finally, Friendly
observed that the inconsistency in approach to the transfer of contract rights in Ferrerand Billy Rose would demand perhaps en banc
consideration by the instant court. He felt, however, than any en
banc proceedings should be delayed to allow the Tax Court to resolve its contradictory decisions in Boston Fish Market and the
3
instant case free of the self-imposed restraints of Billy Rose. 1
Although the instant decision lacks the impact of a clear holding, it is a significant indication that within the Second Circuit the
basic conflict between the two analytical approaches for determining the character of gain resulting from a transfer of contract rights
has not been resolved in favor of the survival test, as Billy Rose
seemed to imply.38 Rather, in an obscure opinion, Judge Friendly
has a duty to treat similarly situated taxpayers consistently-he cannot concede capital gains
treatment in Boston Fish Market and dispute it in the instant case when both have almost
identical facts-and because the opinion in Boston Fish Market stated specifically that
restoration payments "have generally been regarded as having been received in the sale or
exchange of the unrestored property." 57 T.C. at 889.
35. Jack E. Golson, 54 T.C. 742 (1970). "It is our best judgment that better administration requires us to follow a court of appeals decision which is squarely in point where appeal
from our decision lies to that court of appeals and to that court alone." Id. at 750.
36. The court, noting that the § 453 installment sales provision was to be strictly
construed, cited Murray v. United States, 426 F.2d 376, 381 (Ct. Cl. 1970), as authority for
the proposition that the section does not characterize the nature of the gain in question but
merely defers the reporting of certain taxable gain. 476 F.2d at 988.
37. Although the court indicated that it agreed with taxpayer's characterization of the
proceeds as capital gain, Judge Friendly stated in a footnote to the opinion that taxpayer's
attempt to use its basis for the entire building to determine the amount of gain was unwarranted. 476 F.2d at 989 n.9. He felt that taxpayer's basis should be allocated as in Boston
Fish Market, in which the Tax Court held that proceeds received in lieu of restoration were
"taxable to the extent that they exceeded the undepreciated basis of the leasehold improvements destroyed, removed, or disconnected by the lessee." 57 T.C. at 889.
38. See Case Note, supra note 25, at 184, 192.
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implicitly reasserted his adherence- to the equitable interest test
formulated in Ferrer. The obscurity of the opinion results from its
treatment of several problems, the first being the inconsistent treat-ment accorded restoration payments by the Tax Court in Boston
Fish Market and the instant case. The erratic treatment of these
payments by the Tax Court normally would be a matter for its own
resolution, but Friendly effectively ordered the Tax Court to harmonize the results in the instant case and in Boston Fish Market by
eliminating any grounds for reliance on Billy. Rose. By distinguishing the "sale or other disposition" requirement at issue in Billy Rose
and the "sale or exchange" requirement in the instant case,
Friendly confined the holding of Billy Rose to section 453 cases. The
narrow interpretation thus given Billy Rose by Friendly effectively
limited its impact just as Judge Hay's narrow interpretation of the
holding of Ferrer in Billy Rose severely limited the impact of the
equitable interest approach. 39 The distinction drawn between the
Second Circuit's analysis of section 453 and section 1231 transactions for tax purposes seems, therefore, to be based not on considered judicial reasoning, but on the conflict between individual
judges' attitudes toward the analysis of the disposition of contract
rights. Regarding the conflict in the circuit, the instant decision is
particularly interesting in that Judge Friendly cites Ferrer only
briefly. The opinion studiously avoids discussion of Ferrerand fails
to analyze the case in terms of Ferrer'sequitable interest test, possibly to avoid establishing an absolute split within the circuit. The
effect of the decision, however, is merely to postpone the inevitable
en banc proceedings necessary to resolve the conflict and, in the
meantime, to encourage the various elements in the circuit to interpret previous cases to suit individual theories. The absence of a
clearly definitive distinction in the Second Circifit between a section
453 "sale or other disposition" and a section 1231 "sale or exchange"
is a function of the more basic conflict among courts that can be
attributed in part to lack of congressional initiative in delineating
the boundaries of these two phrases. The failure of Congress to
define either phrase 0 and its seemingly interchangeable use of the
phrases in the Code4 have created a problem of statutory interpre39. See text accompanying note 27 supra.
40. See note 12 supra.
41. For example, § 1001 applies the phrase "sale or other disposition of property" when
designating occasions for computing gain or loss from property transactions but speaks of a
"sale or exchange" when discussing the recognition of gains or losses in § 1001(c). INT. REv.
CODE OF 1954, § 1001. See Comment, supra note 12, at 701-04.
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tation for the judiciary. In several instances, Congress has enacted
provisions expressly including specific transactions within definitional limits;4 2 obviously, the most immediate and effective cure for
the circuits' conflict would be an express inclusion or exclusion of
restoration payments. Future en banc consideration of the conflict
between Ferrerand Billy Rose seems, however, to be the most certain means for resolution of the problem in the immediate future.

Uniform Commercial Code - Suretyship Surety's Equitable Priority in Defaulting Contractor's Retained Proceeds Does Not Extend to
Contractor's Personal Property
Plaintiff surety brought a declaratory judgment action' to
2
determine priorities between the surety and defendant bank-lender
to proceeds from the sale of a defaulting contractor's personal property.3 The surety contended that completion of its suretyship obligations under performance bonds upon default of the contractor4 cre42. For example, Congress provided that a transfer of a patent or an undivided interest
therein will be considered the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than 6 months.
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1235. See also note 22 supra.
1. Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. H 2201-02 (1970).
2. The primary parties that this comment discusses are the plaintiff surety, Aetna
Casualty and Surety Company (Aetna), and one of 2 defendant banks, the National Bank of
South Dakota (NBSD). The other bank, Northwestern National Bank (NWB), also claims
priority to the proceeds, but since the perfected security interest of NBSD in the contractor's
personal property is held superior to that of NWB, this comment eliminates the latter from
discussion. Therefore, this comment focuses on the primary issue of the conflict between the
surety and the lender (NBSD), and discusses only peripherally the collateral issue of priorities
between the 2 banks. See note 11 infra.
3. The personal property involved was the contractor's equipment. Under the performance bond applications, the contractor assigned to Aetna as surety "all rights, title and
interest in and to all tools, plant, equipment and materials of every nature and description
that the said [contractor] may now or hereafter have upon said work, or in or about the site
thereof, or used in connection with the work and located elsewhere. . . " (emphasis added).
No steps were taken by Aetna to perfect its interest under Article 9 of the UCC, NBSD had
established a line of credit with the contractor, and had financed numerous equipment
purchases. On January 25, 1968, the contractor entered into a security agreement with NBSD
whereby NBSD obtained a security interest in equipment, as well as other specific property.
The agreement also contained an after-acquired property clause, giving NBSD a security
interest in all other equipment subsequently acquired by the contractor. This security agreement was perfected by the appropriate filing of a financing statement in accordance with Part
4 of Article 9 of the Code.
4. The surety normally furnishes either performance or payment bonds, or both, in
these construction project arrangements in order to guarantee the contractor's completion of
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ated a prevailing equitable lien ' upon the proceeds. Surety maintained alternatively that even if its claim under the bond application provisions6 constituted a security interest under the Uniform
Commercial Code,7 the secured transaction provisions of the Code
did not apply." Arguing that the UCC properly governs this suretylender conflict, defendant bank-lender, who had taken a security
interest in the contractor's equipment to secure loans, asserted that
it acquired priority over the surety' in the equipment sale proceeds
by perfecting its security interest in the contractor's personal property in accordance with the applicable UCC provisions.'" The
United States District Court for the District of South Dakota, held,
judgment for the defendant." When a surety and a lender are assigned rights in the same personal property of a defaulting contractor under a bond application and a security agreement respectively,
the UCC governs; the secured lender who has perfected his security
interest in the property under the Code takes priority over the surety
who asserts equitable claims arising from completion of its bond
obligations. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. J.F. Brunken & Sons,
Inc., 357 F. Supp. 290 (D.S.D. 1973).
The traditional conflict between a defaulting contractor's surety and a commercial creditor continues to provide a prolific source
of litigation. Typically, the surety writes performance and payment
the project. See note 12 infra. If the contractor fails to meet its obligations under the contract,
the surety is then compelled to perform under the bond provisions.
5. For a discussion of the equitable lien and subrogation theories see note 20 infra and
accompanying text. In the instant case, the surety relied solely upon the equitable lien
doctrine. Note that the surety contends that the equitable lien relates back to the inception
of the suretyship agreement.
6. See note 3 supra.
7. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(37). Unless otherwise specified, all references to
the Uniform Commercial Code will be to the 1962 Official Text with official comments.
8. Surety contends that the Code excludes its security interest from the filing and
perfection provisions due to section 9-104(f) which provides: "This Article does not apply...
to a . . . transfer of a contract right to an assignee who is also to do the performance under
the contract ....
"
9. The surety had an unperfected interest in the proceeds because it failed to file and
perfect under Parts 3 and 4 of Article 9 of the UCC.
10. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-109, 9-301, 9-302, 9-401-02.
11. As to the collateral issue dealing with priority between the 2 banks, NBSD and
NWB, the court employed the rule of "first to file" under § 9-312(5)(a) of the Code and held
in favor of NBSD, which had filed prior to NWB. The financing statement of NBSD was
identical to its security agreement except in naming and describing the collateral covered.
NWB contended that NBSD's security interest should be limited to those items listed in the
financing statement. The court rejected NWB's argument, however, reasoning that such a
discrepancy was not determinative since NWB knew of NBSD's extensive security interest
in contractor's equipment and was therefore not misled by the financing statement.
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bonds to guarantee completion of a construction project by a building contractor, 2 and the lender takes an assignment of the contract
rights of the contractor as security for a construction loan. 13 The
conflict arises when, upon default of the contractor, the surety,
pursuant to bond provisions, performs the remaining contract obligations by either completing the project, paying the outstanding
claims of laborers and materialmen, or both. 4 The competing claimants then assert rights to certain funds, consisting of either earned
but unpaid progress payments in the building owner's possession,'
progress payments earned by the surety upon completion of the
contractual obligations, " progress payments already paid to the
contractor or his lender, 7 or, most frequently, a retained percentage
of the contract price held by the owner as security for completion
of the project and payment of outstanding claims. 8 The resulting
12. Execution of these bonds virtually always occurs when such negotiations for construction contracts take place. When dealing with government contracts moreover, such
bonds are required. Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. § 270a(a)(1)-(2) (1970). See National Shawmut
Bank v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 411 F.2d 843 (1st Cir. 1969); Home Indem. Co. v. United
States, 433 F.2d 764 (Ct. Cl. 1970). Furthermore, in situations involving private contracts,
such bonds are usually required and almost always are executed. See Framingham Trust Co.
v. Gould-National Batteries, Inc., 427 F.2d 856 (lst Cir. 1970); Withers, Surety vs. Lender:
Priority of Claims to Contract Funds, 10 WASHauRN L.J. 356, 357 (1971); Note, Equitable
Subrogation-Too Hardy a Plant to Be Uprooted by Article 9 of the UCC?, 32 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 580, 581 (1971).
13. The situation usually involves a subsequent loan by a bank or other lending institution. The contractor can have an established line of credit with the lender, as in the instant
case, or he may be engaging in his initial loan transaction with the lender. No one has
questioned the applicability of Article 9 of the UCC to the security interest granted the lender.
See Note, supra note 12, at 581-82.
14. See Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132 (1962); National Shawmut Bank
v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 411 F.2d 843 (1st Cir. 1969); Jacobs v. Northeastern Corp., 416
Pa. 417, 206 A.2d 49 (1965) (where surety paid laborers and materialmen, doctrine of equitable suborgation applies, and surety is entitled to monies withheld by the state as successors
to rights of contractor); Withers, supra note 12.
15. See United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234 (1947) (United States withheld
percentages of progress payments due the contractor); National Shawmut Bank v. New
Amsterdam Cas. Co., 411 F.2d 843 (1st Cir. 1969) (see particularly the cases cited in n.9, at
848); Trinity Univ. Ins. Co. v. United States, 382 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1967) (surety who
completes contract has right to remaining progress payments held by government).
16. For an excellent discussion of the status of the funds over which disputes normally
arise, see Rudolph, Financing on Construction Contracts Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 5 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 245 (1964); see Note, supra note 12.
17. See Rudolph, supra note 16; Note, supra note 12.
18. See Henningsen v. United States Fidel. & Guar. Co., 208 U.S. 404 (1908); Home
Indem. Co. v. United States, 433 F.2d 764 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (surety and financing institutions
both claiming rights to retained funds); Scarsdale Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States
Fidel. & Guar. Co., 264 N.Y. 159, 190 N.E. 330 (1934) (surety had superior right to money
due the contractor at the time of contractor's default); Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. City of
Stafford, 93 Kan. 539, 144 P. 852 (1914) (surety who performed under performance bond is
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issue becomes whether the surety can assert superior rights to the
funds under equitable lien and subrogation doctrines 9 and thereby
defeat the claims which the lender acquired by assignment. The
-courts traditionally have held in favor of the surety by entitling it
to an equitable right of subrogation to the rights of the parties made
whole by the surety's performance under the suretyship agreement.2 " The surety's rights under the equitable doctrines arise by
operation of law to avoid injustice, and they exist independent of
any expressed contractual terms. 21 In the 1896 decision of Prairie
State Bank v. United States,22 which involved a surety-lender conflict arising after the surety completed a government contract upon
the contractor's default, the Supreme Court held that the surety
possessed a superior equitable right to indemnification from the
retained security funds held by the government. The Court declared
that the surety was subrogated to the rights and remedies of the
government, which was entitled to protect itself out of the withheld
entitled to retained funds under doctrine of equitable subrogation). The consensus appears
to be that there is no difference in the result if the fund involves retainage or unearned
progress payments. If, however, payments have already been paid to the lender, a different
result may occur. See National Shawmut Bank v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 411 F.2d 843,
847-48 (1st Cir. 1969).
19. See note 20 infra.
20. The basis of the equitable doctrines is that the surety's completion of the contract
of payment of the outstanding claims entitles it to the disputed funds to the extent necessary
for reimbursement and indemnification. The surety is therefore subrogated to the rights of
those whom his performance benefits and relieves of obligations-the laborers and materialmen who have an equitable lien on funds to the extent of money due them and the owner
who has a right to apply the retained funds to the cost of either completing the project, paying
outstanding claims, or both. See Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132 (1962); Henningsen v. United States Fidel. & Guar. Co., 208 U.S. 404 (1908); National Shawmut Bank v.
New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 411 F.2d 843 (1st Cir. 1969); National Sur. Corp. v. United States,
133 F. Supp. 381 (Ct. Cl. 1955) (where surety discharges its liability on contractor's bonds
executed to United States by paying laborers and materialmen, its equities in money held
by United States and due under contract are superior to those of bank who lent money to
defaulting contractor). See generally Cushman, The Surety's Right of EquitablePriority to
Contract Balances in Relation to the Uniform Commercial Code, 39 TEMP. L.Q. 239 (1966);
Withers, supra note 12.
21. See Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132, 136-37 (1962); Jacobs v. Northeastern Corp., 416 Pa. 417, 426, 206 A.2d 49, 53 (1965); United States Fidel. & Guar. Co. v.
Maryland Cas. Co., 186 Kan. 637, 643, 352 P.2d 70, 76 (1960) (surety's rights arise without
regard to contract terms and are founded on principles ofinatural justice). Significantly, these
equitable principles apply whether public or private construction contracts are involved. See
Framingham Trust Co. v. Gould-National Batteries, Inc., 427 F.2d 856, 858 (1st Cir. 1970);
Cramer, Uniform Commercial Code: Surety v. Lender, 3 THE FORUM 295 (1971); Withers,
supra note 12. It is noteworthy that some commentators distinguish between express assignments to the surety and the surety's equitable rights. See Recent Development, 65 COLUM.
L. REv. 927, 931 (1965); Note, National Shawmut Bank: Another Step Toward Confusion in
Surety Law, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 582, 588-89 (1969).
22. 164 U.S. 227 (1896).
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funds. Twelve years later, in Henningsen v. United States Fidelity
& Guaranty Co., 3 the Court adopted the reasoning of PrairieState
Bank and upheld the surety's prior claim to contract balances due
the defaulting contractor. After completing the construction project, the contractor failed to pay the laborers and materialmen who
had an equitable lien on the retained funds. Performance by the
surety under the payment bond prompted the Court to apply the
equitable subrogation theory, granting the surety the rights of those
laborers and materialmen whom he reimbursed. This trend of
common-law decisions holding in favor of the surety culminated in
Pearlman v. Reliance Insurance Co. 24 In that case the government
had paid the balance due the bankrupt contractor to the trustee in
bankruptcy while the surety had satisfied the claims of materialmen
and laborers with an amount greater than the balance withheld.
When the surety sought to recover the transferred funds, the Court
declared that the surety owned an equitable lien or prior right to the
fund before the bankruptcy adjudication. 25 Having lost these
common-law contests for priority over the surety's interests, lenders
advanced a new argument. Focusing on the enactment of the UCC,
the lender contended that by perfecting the assignment to it of the
contractor's rights, the lender gained priority over the surety under
Article Nine of the Code.26 Notably, no provision of the Code provides specifically for subrogation or for the surety's rights in construction contract litigation. 21 In assessing the effect of the Code on
the surety's equitable subrogation rights, however, the courts and
commentators generally have concluded that the common-law re23. 208 U.S. 404 (1908).
24. 371 U.S. 132 (1962). The Court stated that the equitable doctrines apply whether
the bonds given by surety are for performance or payment, or both. Moreover, Justice Black
avowed that "there are few doctrines better established than that a surety who pays the debt
of another is entitled to all the rights of the person he paid to enforce his right to be reimbursed." Id. at 136-37.
25. The reasoning of the Pearlman Court was that: "[Tihe Government had a right
to use the retained fund to pay laborers and materialmen; . . .the laborers and materialmen
had a right to be paid out of the fund; . . . the contractor, had he completed his job...
would have become entitled to the fund; [and therefore,I the surety, having paid the laborers
and materialmen, is entitled to the benefit of all those rights to the extent necessary to
reimburse it." Id. at 141; see Cushman, supra note 20, at 244.
26. Since the lender's security interest is provided for by the Code and since the lender
has perfected its interest by filing in compliance with the relevant Code provisions, the lender
claims priority over what it argues is the surety's unperfected security interest in the same
collateral. For the provisions under which the lender claims priority, see UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE §§ 9-301(1), 9-312(5).
27. See National Shawmut Bank v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 411 F.2d 843, 846-47 (1st
Cir. 1969); Note, supra note 12.
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sult favoring the surety remains unaltered. 28 For instance, in the
leading case of National Shawmut Bank v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. ,25 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit recognized
that section 1-103"11 of the Code explicitly preserves all principles of
law and equity unless displaced by specific Code provisions." Extending this rationale, the National Shawmut Bank court set forth
the generally accepted proposition that the Code cannot displace
the common-law results since the surety's equitable claims are not
security interests within the Code. 32 Article Nine applies only to
consensual security interests created by contract, 3 whereas the surety's equitable rights, inherent in the suretyship relation, arise by
operation of law and not from consent of the parties.3 4 Rejecting the
lender's argument, the courts have concluded that a surety does not
need to file and perfect under the UCC to protect its equitable
28. See Mickelson v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 452 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1971) and cases
cited therein; National Shawmut Bank v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 411 F.2d 843 (1st Cir.
1969); Jacobs v. Northeastern Corp., 416 Pa. 417, 206 A.2d 49 (1965); UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 9-102, Comment 1; J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 769-70
(1972). But see United States v. G.P. Fleetwood & Co., 165 F. Supp. 723, 725 (W.D. Pa. 1958)
(where performance bond application was not filed under UCC, surety had no right as lienholder against principal's bankruptcy trustee); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. State Pub.
School Bldg. Authority, 26 Pa. D. & C.2d 717, 726-33 (1961) (surety required to file and
perfect under UCC its performance bond application in order to protect its rights against
lending bank); Recent Development, supra note 21; Note, supra note 21.
29. 411 F.2d 843 (1st Cir. 1969).
30. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-103. This section provides: "Unless displaced by the
particular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity . . . shall supplement its
provisions."
31. 411 F.2d at 845; see Cushman, supra note 20, at 248.
32. 411 F.2d at 845. The surety's argument is that the definitional sections of the UCC
pertaining to security interests-§§ 1-201(37) and 9-102(1)(a) and (b)-are not applicable to
its interest. The surety asserts that its interest in the construction contract is neither an
interest in personal property or contract rights to secure an obligation, nor a purchase of
contract rights. The securing of payment to the surety actually results from "the opportunity,
on default, to finish the job and apply any available funds against its cost of completion."
Id. The Shawmut court further states that "[wihile one may strain to say that the right to
finish a job in an emergency and thus minimize damages is a contract right, we think it is
not the kind of independently valuable asset that such synonyms as 'goods, documents,
instruments, general intangibles, [and] chattel paper' suggest." Id. at 846.
33. "Rights of subrogation, although growing out of a contractual setting and ofttimes
articulated by the contract, do not depend for their existence on a grant in the contract, but
are created by law to avoid injustice. Therefore, subrogation rights are not 'security interests'
within the meaning of Article 9. The sureties' rights. . . are not the usual type of consensual
security interests contemplated by the Code. Jacobs v. Northeastern Corp., 416 Pa. 417, 429,
206 A.2d 49, 55 (1965); see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 28, at 757-58.
34. See Mickelson v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 452 F.2d 1219, 1222 (8th Cir. 1971);
Framingham Trust Co. v. Gould-National Batteries, Inc., 427 F.2d 856 (1st Cir. 1970); National Shawmut Bank v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 411 F.2d 843, 846 (1st Cir. 1969) (rights
of surety not created by contract but rather by a status resulting from the contract).
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claims against the lender's perfected security interest in the contractor's contract rights." Moreover, some courts and commentators, focusing on collateral sections of the UCC,11 have asserted that
certain Code provisions specifically exclude the surety's rights from
Article Nine.3 7 Further analysis of the Code's effect on the suretylender conflict has involved investigation of the legislative history
of the UCC. The 1952 Official Draft included a proposed provision,
section 9-312(7), 38 which clearly subordinated the surety's rights to
retained funds, whether or not perfected, to the perfected security
interest of a subsequent lender. 39 In response to vigorous reaction
and criticism by surety representatives, however, the Editorial
Board of the UCC chose to eliminate section 9-312(7) from subsequent Code drafts. 0 The majority of courts and commentators have
cited the deletion of section 9-312(7) as authority for the conclusion
that the Code was not intended to overrule the established case law
and consequently does not restrict the surety's traditional rights to
35. See cases and materials cited notes 20, 28 & 32 supra.
36. The National Shawmut Bank court discusses, among others, section 9-106, which
defines "account" and "contract right." Addressing the possibility that this section covers a
surety's rights, the court answered negatively. As to "account," the court said that there is
no right to payment when a contractor defaults. As to "contract right," the court found such
a right more akin to a right to receive payments from one who continues with performance
than to a right conditioned on performance by the transferee of the right. 411 F.2d at 846.
37. For discussions of §§ 9-104(c), (f), and (i), see Cramer, supra note 21, at 307-09;
Withers, supra note 12, at 370-71; Note, supra note 12, at 586; J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra
note 28, at 777-78. For arguments of those who advocate application of the Code to the
surety's rights, see Recent Development, supra note 21 at 931-33; Note, supra note 21, at 29294; Note, Jacobs v. Northeastern Corp.: Suretys Dilemma-SubrogationRights or Perfected
Security Interest, 69 DICK. L. REv. 172 (1965).
38. Section 9-312(7) provided: "A security interest which secures an obligation to reimburse a surety or other person secondarily obligated to complete performance is subordinate
to a later security interest given to a secured party who makes a new advance, incurs a new
obligation, releases a perfected security interest or gives other new value to enable the debtor
to perform the obligation for which the earlier secured party is liable." See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-312(7) (1952 version), as cited in Withers, supra note 12 at 364.
39. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-312(7), Comment 9 (1952 version), as cited in
Withers, supra note 12 at 364. Referring to the type of construction contract situation discussed in this comment, the Code's editors stated that subsection (7) subordinated a surety's
interest to a later security interest taken for new value to enable a debtor (contractor) to
perform the contract for which the surety is contingently liable.
40. The Board observed that "[ujnder the existing case law, the surety's rights come
first as to the funds. . . unless the surety has subordinated its rights to the (lender). Subsection (7) . . .as written would reverse the situation and give the (lender) priority in all cases.
It was the feeling of the Editorial Board that existing law should not be disturbed. ...
Subsection (7) . . .was not an oversight. . . . However, the Editorial Board feels that its
inclusion was a mistake." See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-312 (1953 version), as cited in
Withers, supra note 12 at 365.
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the disputed funds.' The weight of authority, therefore, compels the
conclusion that the surety who performs his bond obligations upon
default of a contractor is subrogated to the rights of the contractor
as to outstanding receivables due the contractor, the laborers and
materialmen whom the surety has paid, and the owner for whom the
surety has completed the project. 2 No decision, however, has considered the issue whether the surety's superior equitable rights in
retained proceeds extend further to a defaulting contractor's personal property that has served as additional collateral on a secured
construction loan.
The instant court recognized at the outset the clearly established equitable lien and subrogation theories that are applicable to
the surety-lender contest for retained contract proceeds. " The court
next distinguished the instant factual situation from previous
surety-lender disputes by emphasizing that it involved conflicting
claims to proceeds from the sale of a defaulting contractor's personal
property, and not to retained funds due the contractor. The court
then reasoned that since the facts reveal no unjust enrichment of,
or unconscionable property retention by, the lender,44 the instant
case does not give rise to the application of equitable doctrines. The
court declared that the surety possessed not an equitable lien on the
sale proceeds but a security interest under the Code 5 subject to the
Article Nine filing and perfection requirements. The court further
determined that the contractor's performance bond application did
not convey to the surety a contract right as defined by the Code.47
Reasoning that the surety received an interest in personal property
as security to guarantee reimbursement if required to perform under
41. See cases and articles cited notes 12, 20, & 28 supra. But see articles cited note 21
supra.
42. See National Shawmut Bank v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 411 F.2d 843, 845 (1st
Cir. 1969).
43. The court acknowledged that these theories control when there is an assignment to
the lender by the contractor.
44. The court cited these 2 factors as being among those which form the foundation of
equity jurisprudence. The court buttresses its reasoning by stating that neither the surety nor
the lender can be fully reimbursed by the sale proceeds. The court also noted that while the
equitable lien theory has survived the enactment of the UCC, recent decisions indicate that
the doctrine of equitable mortgages is no longer necessary in commercial transactions, mainly
because Article 9 reduces formal requisites to a minimum. See Shelton v. Erwin, 472 F.2d
1118, 1120 (8th Cir. 1973).
45. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(37).
46. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 9-301(1), -312. As to questions of priority of
interests, the surety is in the position of a general unsecured creditor; the surety has an
unperfected security interest since it has not filed.
47. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-106.
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the suretyship obligations," the court concluded that section 9104(f)," which excludes certain transfers from Article Nine, did not
exclude the surety's security interest from Article Nine filing requirements.50 Refusing to extend the established equitable doctrines
to collateral interests in personal property, the court held that since
the lender perfected first under the Code, the lender's security interest in the contractor's equipment prevailed over the unperfected
interest of the surety in the same property.
The rejection by the instant court of the surety's attempt to
extend equity doctrines from retained-fund disputes 5' to personal
property conflicts has a sound basis. Significant distinctions exist
between equitable claims to funds withheld by the owner and assigned rights in a debtor-contractor's equipment; the surety's proposed analogy between the two cannot be justified. An analysis of
the decisions involving competing claims to retained proceeds reveals that such funds serve the primary purpose of securing complete contract performance. It appears that the owner withholds
funds to provide an incentive for the participating parties to complete properly the construction project. Existing in order to encourage and insure cooperative performance by all construction contract
participants, these funds assume, therefore, a substantial role in the
relationship of the contractor, surety, and lender. In contrast, no
such central purpose characterizes the assignment to the surety of
an interest in the contractor's equipment. The assignment, while
admittedly bearing some relationship to the ultimate goal of complete contract performance, becomes a less significant influence on
contract completion when viewed in light of the rationale underlying the existence of retained funds. Essentially, the assignment constitutes a virtually isolated transaction between the surety and the
contractor whereby the surety, desiring some personal security for
the performance it supplies, obtains an assignment of personal
property from the contractor;52 this transaction has no direct relation to contract performance by the surety for the owner. Moreover,
an analysis of both the status and resulting rights of the participating parties further distinguishes the instant case from those involv48. The court stated that this interest is precisely the kind that the UCC was intended
to govern.
49. Section 9-104(0 provides: "This Article does not apply to . . . a transfer of a
contract right to an assignee who is also to do the performance under the contract."
50. Evidently, the surety did not advance any other exclusion arguments.
51. See notes 15-18 supra and accompanying text.
52. The surety ostensibly is informing the contractor that it wants some security from
the contractor itself-that runs between the two alone-as protection in case of default.
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ing retained proceeds. By its suretyship performance the surety generally acquires only those rights possessed by the creditors whose
claims or obligations it satisfies. 3 The creditors through whom the
surety claims superior rights in funds and contract proceeds
-primarily the owner and laborers and materialmen-possess
themselves a prior right to such funds as against other general creditors. Either the express contract provisions creating the funds or
doctrines providing equitable rights to them may establish such
prior claims." When, therefore, the surety performs its suretyship
obligations upon default of the contractor, it receives rights superior
to those of other general creditors. 5 In the instant case, however, the
creditors whose rights the surety obtained by performance had no
prior claim to the contractor's equipment; they held no preferred
status as to other general creditors. Unlike the retained funds, the
equipment of the contractor does not represent an interest set aside
to secure complete performance and payment. Moreover, since the
respective assignments of personal property by the contractor to the
lender and surety constitute essentially separate transactions, the
owners as well as the laborers and materialmen have no bona fide
equitable or expressed rights in the equipment. Upon default of the
contractor, the most that the surety can claim through these creditors is the status of a general creditor with no prior rights in the
equipment. To provide the surety inherent equitable rights in the
contractor's personal property would therefore necessitate a distorted extension of the rationale favoring the surety in retained-fund
disputes. Turning to a consideration of whether the UCC should
apply to the instant factual situation in light of the noted distinctions, an affirmative answer is compelled. It must be emphasized
that the conflict in the instant case involved personal property interests covered specifically by the Code, and not claims to retained
funds. The surety ostensibly acquired an assignment from the contractor in order to obtain individual security in equipment, and
therefore possessed a direct interest in personal property. It seems
clear that the surety and the contractor intended by their transac53.
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54. In light of the overall purpose of the funds, such priorities are not unrealistic.
Moreover, as noted previously, it is well established that laborers and materialmen possess
prior equitable liens on such proceeds. See note 20, supra.
55. The surety generally receives these rights through the doctrine of equitable subrogation. The equitable claims to the equipment asserted by the surety in the instant case seem
to evolve from this doctrine rather than by reason of the assignment. See SIMPSON, supranote
53, at § 47.
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tion, just as did the lender and contractor, to create a consensual
security interest as defined by the Code." These transactions resemble the frequently utilized commercial financing arrangements that
involve personal property as collateral. The UCC, and particularly
Article Nine, was promulgated with the specific purpose of governing commercial transactions of this kind.5 7 Refusal to apply the
Code to the surety's personal property interest in the instant case
would, therefore, not only impede the effectiveness of particular
provisions of the Code but also significantly hinder the important
goal of achieving legal uniformity in the complex field of commercial
financing. Furthermore, if a secured lender has no assurance that it
can rely on the Code to protect its security interests, the lender may
exercise excessive caution in making loans to contractors, especially
those engaged in smaller business operations. Consequently, many
contractors who genuinely need such loans will be denied the opportunity to obtain them. With less competition among contractors
inevitably resulting from such restrained attitudes, the public interest as well as the construction industry would be harmed. 8 Admittedly, the lender presumably knows that a surety has guaranteed a
given construction contract, and moreover, is most likely aware of
the surety's rights to retained funds and contract proceeds. For
notice of the surety's interests in the contractor's personal property,
however, the lender relies almost exclusively on the Code. Having
complied with the Code requisites for protecting its interests, the
lender expects other creditors with similar interests to do likewise.
The desired result is that all parties involved in the construction
contract will have the opportunity to learn of conflicting interests
in the same property. To facilitate this result the Code has reduced
the formal requisites for protecting security interests to a minimum.
An investigation of the simplified, inexpensive filing and perfection
requirements indicates that the surety can easily avail itself of adequate legal protection for its personal property interests. Filing by
the surety in the instant case would have given it a prior claim to
the contractor's equipment.59 The instant court, therefore, has es56.

See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 1-201(37), 9-102.
See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-102, Comment 1.
58. For an argument stating that similar dilemmas would result if the Code were applied to disputes over retained funds, see Cushman, supra note 20, at 249-55.
59. Since most surety-lender conflicts in construction contract arrangements seem to

57.

involve loans made subsequent to the execution of the suretyship agreement, immediate filing
and perfection by the surety of its personal property interests would insure the surety's
priority in the majority of situations. For an interesting argument proposing that the surety
has a purchase money security interest in the retained funds, see Recent Development, supra
note 21.
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tablished a significant new precedent to govern the continuing conflict between equitable doctrines favoring the surety and application of the UCC, and has determined, correctly it seems, that the
surety, like other general creditors, must readily comply with the
relevant Code provisions to protect its personal property interests
in certain commercial transactions.

